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1. Introduction 
Negative nominal interest rates have long been considered impossible.1 As a consequence, 
research has focused on understanding monetary policy transmission at or above the zero lower 
bound (ZLB), while paying less attention to the dynamics when rates go negative. Since 2014, 
however, central banks in Denmark, the Euro Area, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland have 
moved their policy rates into negative territory. As a result, it has become necessary and 
empirically possible to investigate monetary transmission and its impact on financial stability 
below the ZLB. We contribute to this investigation by studying detailed and comprehensive 
supervisory data from Switzerland. 
In January 2015, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) lowered its deposit facility rate from zero to 
-75 basis points (bps), and chose to apply this rate only to the fraction of each bank’s central 
bank reserves that exceeded twenty times its minimum reserve requirement (MRR).2 Reserves 
in December 2014, less the bank-specific but unpredicted exemptions, therefore provide a 
direct measure of negative rate exposure that we can exploit for identification. Specifically, we 
gauge the causal effects on bank-level outcomes by comparing the behavior of banks with 
different initial exposure over time. 
Our results reflect banks’ reluctance to charge negative deposit rates, and reveal implied costs 
that are not typically observed during the transmission of positive rates: first, with incomplete 
pass-through to the deposit rate, negative reserve and interbank rates led to negative liability 
margins. Second, banks that wanted to reduce their reserves but did not want to substitute them 
entirely with other assets, had to shorten their balance sheets. Since deposit volumes were 
difficult to adjust under the self-imposed ZLB, banks reduced mostly non-deposit liabilities, 
and in particular (covered) bonds. This led to stronger increases in deposit and unweighted 
capital ratios among banks that were more heavily exposed to negative rates, despite relatively 
cheaper bond and interbank funding, and–in turn–raised their average funding costs. At the 
same time, because more exposed banks reduced their long-term bond financing and short-
                                                             
1  Paul Krugman, for instance, wrote in 2013 that “the zero lower bound isn’t a theory, it’s a fact” 
(https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/15/five-on-the-floor/; accessed: September 14, 2017). 
2 With aggregate reserves equal to 24 times the sum of banks’ MRR, this was presumably done to affect marginal but not total reserve costs. 
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term reserves more than less exposed banks, their maturity mismatch and therefore their 
interest rate risk also increased in comparison. 
Despite non-negative deposit rates, our results also show that costs are nonetheless transmitted 
to customers. Banks that were more affected by negative rates increased their lending-related 
and overall fee income more in response to the SNB’s negative interest rate policy (NIRP) than 
less affected banks. This effect was even stronger for banks operating in more concentrated 
markets, in which case they also managed to reduce their borrowing costs more. Banks, in other 
words, avoided negative deposit rates–presumably to not loose depositors as future customers 
and to protect their reputation–but achieved some pass-through if they had market power and 
indirectly via fees.3 
Beyond the compensation through fees, we identify additional adjustments on the asset side of 
the balance sheet. More exposed banks more strongly reduced their safe reserves, implying a 
stronger rebalancing of their portfolios towards mortgages, uncollateralized loans and financial 
assets. The effect on mortgages is of particular interest in Switzerland, where the 
implementation of negative policy rates was accompanied by increasing mortgage rates (Bech 
& Malkhozov, 2016).4 We find that these mortgage rate increases were more pronounced the 
more a bank was exposed to the SNB’s NIRP, implying that we can causally attribute at least 
some of the aggregate changes to the negative reserve rate. The question then arises through 
which channels the negative rate on SNB reserves led more exposed banks to increase their 
mortgage rates. Our results suggest as key driver the stronger increase in more exposed banks’ 
marginal cost of mortgages, which follow from the substitution of bond with deposit and equity 
financing, as well as from constrained downward flexibility of the deposit rate, and which put 
pressure on lending rates. We also test three prominent reasons, for why this upward pressure 
may have been amplified for more exposed banks: first, we test whether banks increased their 
mark-ups in response to squeezed liability margins; second, we investigate whether higher 
lending rates reflect higher risk premiums and hence reduced lending standards; and third, we 
                                                             
3 Depositors provide a valuable source of stable funding during normal times, and–as mortgage borrowers and investors–often generate 
additional income for banks. They are therefore important for the banks in our sample and practitioners we spoke with feared they would be 
hard to win back once ties were cut. 
4 Similarly, Eggertson et al. (2017) report evidence of increasing mortgage margins in response to negative policy rates in Sweden. 
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analyze whether higher costs of using interest rate swaps under negative LIBOR rates drove 
up mortgage rates further. We do not find strong support for either of these factors. 
With a self-imposed ZLB on deposit rates, and the consequences for banks’ funding structure, 
the implications for risk-taking incentives under negative interest rates, are ex-ante ambiguous. 
As the balance sheet shares of common equity increase more for more affected banks, lower 
leverage might reduce risk-shifting. At the same time, as more affected shift some funding 
from uninsured interbank and bond funding to insured deposit funding, they may have been 
monitored less. De facto, we find a stronger increase in more affected banks’ average risk-
weights (i.e. credit risk), as well as a stronger increase in these banks’ maturity mismatch (i.e. 
interest rate risk). 
For comparison, we also investigate banks’ reaction to an earlier rate cut in positive territory. 
We find a weaker response of loan and financial asset shares, a comparable effect on deposit 
ratios, and no effect on fees. This supports our conclusion that transmission works differently 
below the ZLB, with the difference resulting primarily from the self-imposed non-negativity 
of deposit rates. 
Throughout, our analysis relies on detailed supervisory information about the universe of banks 
chartered in Switzerland. We use a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) methodology, with central 
bank reserves, net of exemptions, as the continuous treatment variable. Identification stems 
from the timing and design of the SNB’s NIRP, aided–in our benchmark analysis–by a focus 
on domestically owned retail banks. The Swiss NIRP was first communicated on December 
18, 2014 and then revised, before it was implemented on January 22, 2015. While banks may 
still have anticipated some form of NIRP and even a vague role for central bank reserves, it is 
highly unlikely that the exact exemptions were anticipated. It might have been possible to 
foresee that certain types of banks would be systematically more affected than others, but the 
same does not hold within business models, where moderate fluctuations in reserves are a 
common feature of day-to-day operations. Our data contain two groups of banks that are 
sufficiently large to study within-group differences: Wealth management (WM) banks and 
5 
retail banks.5 The former, however, hold non-negligible fractions of their assets and liabilities 
in foreign currency (FX). This is potentially problematic for our purposes, because the SNB 
removed its exchange rate peg vis-à-vis the Euro at the same time at which it began to charge 
a negative reserve rate. As a consequence, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the exchange 
rate and the negative rate on WM banks’ behavior. For our main analysis, we therefore restrict 
attention to domestically owned retail banks with almost no FX exposure.6 These banks might 
experience exchange rate driven demand effects, but for them to affect our identification, they 
would need to vary systematically with banks’ negative rate exposure. The same consideration 
applies to demand more generally, for which our setup assumes no correlation with banks’ 
exposed reserves. As long as this holds, our DiD setup captures the effect of negative rate 
exposure on bank-level outcomes. The focus on retail banks in our benchmark analysis also 
improves external validity. Swiss WM banks are, to an important degree, a product of their 
legal and supervisory environment, while retail banks are more comparable to their 
counterparts in other developed economies. 
Our results are robust to alternative treatment definitions and to controlling for time-invariant 
bank characteristics, as well as period-specific effects. Our ability to observe key outcome 
variables at monthly frequency further enables us to analyze the timing and evolution of each 
effect after the treatment, and to support the assumption of parallel pre-treatment trends in our 
dependent variables. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to comprehensively study the effect of negative 
nominal rates on retail banks. These banks are particularly relevant for households as mortgage 
borrowers and depositors. In addition, the Swiss policy design and our supervisory data allow 
us to offer a detailed anatomy of the effect on balance sheets, income, and risk-taking. Notably, 
it does not require us to assume a ZLB on deposits, but allows us, instead, to provide evidence 
of its existence. 
                                                             
5 Notice that this excludes in particular the two large universal banks, of which there are too few for a meaningful statistical analysis, and 
cooperative banks, which face a common exemption and reallocate resources among cooperative members. 
6 For additional insight, we also report results on Wealth Management (WM) in Table 10, and discuss them in Section 5.1. 
6 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines how we contribute to 
the existing literature. Section 3 introduces the Swiss context, our data, and our identification 
strategy. Section 4 presents our baseline results on banks’ reallocation of SNB reserves and the 
role of the ZLB for deposits. This includes implications for income, bank-level interest rates, 
and portfolio rebalancing, as well as the comparison with an earlier interest rate cut in positive 
territory. Section 5 provides complementary results on WM banks, an exploration of the role 
of capital buffers, and the effects of the NIRP on banks’ foreign currency exposure. It also 
studies the interaction of the NIRP with liquidity regulation under Basel III and the role of 
banks’ deposit rates prior to the NIRP. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Relationship with the existing Literature 
Although the related literature–both empirical and theoretical–is in many cases still 
preliminary, some papers nonetheless provide a valuable reference: Nucera et al. (2017) 
identify differential responses to negative rates across Euro Area banks with different business 
models, and in comparison to rate cuts in positive territory. They observe that large banks with 
more diversified income become less systemically risky under negative rates, while riskiness 
increases for smaller banks.7 This is consistent with our findings for Switzerland, according to 
which the (relatively small) banks in our sample become riskier, but use fees to increase 
profitability. Differences across business models in the reaction of Euro Area banks also feature 
in Demiralp et al. (2017), who use reserves, but without an unpredicted exemption, for 
identification. Similar to our effect on bond funding, their paper finds that (some) banks reduce 
wholesale funding in response to negative rates. Heider et al. (2017) also study Euro Area 
banks, but focus on lead arrangers of syndicated loans. Exploiting cross-sectional heterogeneity 
in deposit funding, they simultaneously identify a contraction in total lending and an expansion 
of credit to riskier borrowers. Different from us, they observe no effect on fees or loan rates. 
This suggests that risk-taking in their sample is likely to be the result of reduced net worth and 
a shift, under limited liability, towards riskier borrowers. In our sample, instead, both (book) 
                                                             
7 The analysis is extended in Lucas et al. (forthc.). 
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equity and risk-taking (in the form of credit and interest rate risk) increase more for more 
exposed banks.8 
In addition to studying domestically owned retail banks, our work also differs from these 
papers in its focus on a non-Euro country, the coverage of our data, and the Swiss policy design. 
Our negative deposit facility rate is almost twice that in the Euro Area, our original sample 
includes all banks chartered in Switzerland, and we observe all assets and liabilities at monthly 
frequency. 
Explicit theoretical work on the transmission of negative rates is rare: Brunnermeier & Koby 
(2017) study low but not explicitly negative rate environments and show how rate cuts turn 
contractionary for capital-constrained banks. We find evidence consistent with their 
predictions for mortgages, but not for uncollateralized loans. Eggertson et al. (2017) assume a 
lower bound on deposit rates and banks that are entirely deposit-funded, as well as a negative 
correlation between bank profits and intermediation costs. They predict adverse effects on 
profits and credit supply, while banks in our sample manage to compensate for squeezed 
margins by increasing their interest and fee income.  
Beyond this on-going work on negative rates, we also contribute–more generally–to the 
literature on monetary policy transmission, and the bank lending and risk-taking channels. 
Existing papers typically find expansionary responses to lower rates, and often-negative 
correlations between interest rates and risk-taking (e.g. Maddaloni & Peydro, 2011; Altunbas 
et al., 2014; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016). The effect on lending is weaker if banks are less well 
capitalized or liquidity constrained (Jimenez et al., 2012) and risk-taking is reflected in reduced 
collateral requirements (Jimenez et al., 2014). In addition, it seems to be the case that increasing 
credit risk is not always reflected in higher spreads and that holding liquid assets amplifies risk-
taking incentives (Ioannidou et al., 2014).9 Evidence that banks might respond differently with 
respect to mortgages, is provided by Landier et al. (2015), who show that monetary policy 
tightening induced the offering of riskier loans. 
                                                             
8 See Eisenschmidt & Smets (2017) for a review of the literature on negative policy rates. 
9 The relevance of liquidity for monetary policy transmission is also present in Kashyap & Stein (2000), who attribute it primarily to small 
banks. A stronger effect for smaller and undercapitalized banks, instead, features in Kishan & Opiela (2000). 
8 
At first glance, our results are broadly consistent with this literature: a rate cut below zero 
induces stronger increases in loan shares and ex-ante portfolio risk among more exposed banks. 
Upon closer inspection, however, the transmission channel changes below the ZLB. 
Commentary (Cecchetti & Schoenholtz, 2016; Danthine, 2016) suggests that negative interest 
rates are special because banks’ ability to adjust the cost of deposits is constrained by the return 
on cash. Ceteris paribus, negative interest rates on central bank reserves are therefore predicted 
to squeeze banks’ net interest income. Following the reasoning of Dell’Ariccia & Marquez 
(2013) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014), a lower bound on short-term borrowing rates would then 
imply that the risk-taking channel is dominated by incentives for risk-shifting and the search 
for yield. Monetary transmission mechanisms, in other words, do not change fundamentally 
below zero, but they are subject to an important additional constraint: the ZLB on deposits. On 
the one hand, this constraint suppresses the positive effects on net worth that one would expect 
in positive rate environments and–in turn–amplifies risk-shifting incentives (Heider et al., 
2017). On the other hand, it leads to relatively higher shares of (relatively more costly and 
insured) deposit funding, which impairs monitoring and generates incentives to search for yield 
(this paper).10 
3. Background, Data, and Identification 
3.1. The Swiss context 
Prior to January 2015, monetary policy in Switzerland was conducted via open market 
operations. The SNB defined upper and lower bounds for the target interbank rate and injected 
or extracted liquidity from the market to navigate the 3-month CHF LIBOR within these 
bounds. By contrast, no interest was paid on central bank reserves. On December 12, 2008, the 
lower target bound was reduced to zero, while the upper bound was subsequently lowered from 
1% to 0.75% on March 12, 2009, and to 0.25% on August 03, 2011. For comparison, the last 
time the lower bound was set to zero, from March 06, 2003 to September 15, 2004, the upper 
bound was kept between 0.75% and 1%. Unable to narrow the target range further, the SNB 
                                                             
10 See Lian et al. (2017) for experimental evidence on individuals’ “reach for yield” in low interest rate environments. 
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then moved the lower bound to -0.75% on December 18, 2014, and announced a return of -
0.25% on banks’ sight deposit account balances for January 22, 2015. In a subsequent 
communication on January 15, 2015, the rate announcement was lowered further to -0.75% 
and the target bounds for the LIBOR rate were moved to -1.25% and -0.25% respectively. 
Presumably to ensure interbank transmission while limiting the strain on the system at large, 
the SNB applied negative rates only to marginal Swiss Francs, and exempted most infra-
marginal reserves. With system-wide liquidity worth about 24 times the sum of banks´ MRR, 
it exempted, more specifically, all central bank reserves below “20 times the minimum reserve 
requirement for the reporting period 20 October 2014 to 19 November 2014 (static 
component), minus any increase/plus any decrease in the amount of cash held (dynamic 
component)“.11 Importantly, for our purposes, the exemption was thus designed to manage 
aggregate liquidity and was not targeted towards specific banks. This policy design implied 
that banks could not anticipate the degree to which they were exposed to negative rates, and 
constitutes the core of our identification. 
What further distinguishes the implementation of negative interest rates in Switzerland is that 
it seemed motivated by concerns to restore the interest rate differential with the Euro. That is, 
it was likely designed to prevent excessive CHF appreciation, rather than to stimulate domestic 
demand. Since 2011, the SNB had continuously acquired assets in foreign currency to moderate 
pressure on the Swiss Franc, and to defend an exchange rate of 1.2 CHF vis-à-vis the Euro. 
Despite having communicated a renewed commitment to this exchange rate on December 18, 
the SNB unpegged the Franc on January 15.12 As a consequence, the move into negative rate 
territory was accompanied by an appreciation of the Swiss currency from 1.20 CHF/EUR in 
December 2014 to 1.04 CHF/EUR in April 2015 (Figure A1; Online Appendix).13 For an 
economy reliant on exports, this sudden appreciation constituted an adverse shock and exports 
fell, although only temporarily, between 2014 Q4 and 2015 Q1. Aided by a depreciation of the 
Swiss Franc to the Dollar and tax-financed subsidies for temporarily reduced working hours, 
                                                             
11 http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre_20141218/source/pre_20141218.en.pdf  
12 Some commentators have attributed this decision to concerns that a further expansion of the SNB's holdings of foreign-currency assets 
could at some point cause significant losses and thereby erode its equity and credibility. Others, instead, have posited that even negative equity 
need not be an issue for a central bank. 
13 The rate returned to 1.17 CHF/EUR by December 2017. 
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however, they quickly recovered and GDP growth remained largely unaffected. Effects on 
aggregate demand in Switzerland are further mitigated by generous unemployment benefits, 
which are paid for up to two years and cover 70-80% of previous earnings. 
In short, the fact that monetary policy was largely exogenous to domestic credit/mortgage 
growth in Switzerland supports our identification, while the simultaneous unpegging of the 
CHF-EUR exchange rate constitute a potential concern. This concern, however, is alleviated 
by (a) the observation that GDP growth–as a proxy for credit demand–dropped in 2015Q1 but 
recovered already by the end of the same year; (b) our focus on domestically-owned retail 
banks; and–most importantly–(c) the quasi-random individual exposure to negative rates, 
under the Swiss policy regime.14,15 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the Swiss monetary policy target between July 2013 and 
June 2016, and the corresponding interest rates for overnight (SARON), 3- and 12-month 
interbank (LIBOR) loans, as well as federal government bonds with one-year maturity. All 
short-term rates drop to a level around -0.75% as of January 2015. The 3-month LIBOR rate 
and the overnight lending rate stay close to the target, while the return on one-year government 
bonds is more volatile and initially below target. Consistent with a standard yield curve, the 
return on 12-month interbank loans is on average slightly higher than the target rate. The main 
take-away, for our purposes, is the immediate transmission of the negative reserve rate to 
comparable short-term assets. The return on longer-term assets, instead, exhibits a weaker 
response. Government bonds, covered bonds, cantonal bonds, and bank bonds with 8-year 
maturity continue an almost uninterrupted downward trend that approaches -0.75% only 
around June 2016. A notable exception is the return on non-financial corporation (NFC) bonds 
with the same 8-year maturity, which does not drop further after January 2015 and subsequently 
approaches 1% from below. In view of the effect on banks’ balance sheets, these trends suggest 
that relatively safe financial assets with longer maturities became relatively more attractive. In 
                                                             
14 Real GDP growth (quarterly and seasonally adjusted) dropped from 0.5% in 2014Q3 to -0.39% in 2015Q1, but recovered in subsequent 
quarters to respectively 0.18% (Q2), 0.29% (Q3), and 0.55% (Q4) (Source: www.snb.ch). 
15 It also plays in our favor that the SNB’s decision to charge negative interest on banks’ reserves had no precedent in Swiss monetary policy 
and was implemented with relatively short notice between December 2014 and January 2015. Even if banks had anticipated negative policy 
rates, however, this would bias our results towards zero, implying that our estimates would constitute a lower bound on the full effect. 
11 
addition, however, Figure 1 also suggests an imperfect, albeit existing, pass-through to banks’ 
long-term borrowing costs, with the return on bank bonds remaining positive until June 2016. 
In contrast, we see no transmission of negative rates to sight and demand deposit rates. Banks 
apparently maintained a ZLB on these liabilities, for fear of losing customers who also provide 
non-deposit related business.16 This strategy meant that the liability margin between deposit 
and interbank rate, which is traditionally positive, turned negative. To illustrate this, Figure 2 
plots the evolution of banks’ margins on sight and demand deposits. The average sight deposit 
rate approaches 0.01% after the policy change, while the demand deposit rate drops from 0.15% 
in December 2014 to 0.06% in June 2016. At the same time, banks could only earn a return 
close to the target policy rate of -0.75% on assets with similar maturities (SARON, 3-month 
LIBOR). From December 2014 to February 2015, liability margins thus drop from -0.03% [-
0.17%] to -0.75% [-0.99%] for sight [demand] deposits. 
Furthermore, we also observe the aforementioned response on the asset side of banks’ balance 
sheets. Figure 3 depicts the margin between the average adjustable rate mortgage (rate resetting 
every 3 months based based on the 3-months CHF LIBOR; 3 year contract period) and the 3-
month CHF LIBOR rate itself. While the LIBOR rate dropped to -0.75% after January 2015, 
banks kept the return on adjustable rate mortgages largely unchanged and even increased it for 
fixed rate mortgages. This implied an increase in the corresponding asset margin from 1.18% 
in December 2014 to 2.03% in February 2015. Similarly, the average margin on 10-year fixed-
rate mortgages jumped from 1.22% in December 2014 to 1.74% in February 2015. At the same 
time, we also observe that swap prices adjusted quickly to the new conditions, which most 
likely explains why we do not find banks with swap usage to have raised their mortgage rates 
more than those that do not use interest rate swaps.17 Since mortgages comprise more than 70% 
of assets for the average bank in our sample, higher mortgage margins compensate significantly 
for squeezed liability margins. Simultaneously increasing mortgage shares, as well as 
                                                             
16 Some banks have reportedly discussed negative deposit rates with selected (high net worth or corporate) customers for deposits above very 
high thresholds. These cases do not show up in our data on regular customers however. 
17 Figure A2 in our online Appendix plots the evolution of 5, 10, and 15 year swap rates at daily frequency. Consistent with Figure 3 it shows 
a rapid drop in swap rates across maturities during December 2014/January 2015. 
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reductions in regulatory capital cushions and liquidity coverage, however, imply that the 
economy-wide welfare implications remain unclear. 
In anticipation of our econometric analysis below, several aspects of the Swiss case matter. 
First, the quick succession of events and the lack of a precedent implied that banks could not 
foresee their exposure to negative reserve rates. Second, exemptions did not target individual 
banks. Third, pass-through to the interbank market remained intact. Fourth, banks maintained 
non-negative deposit rates. 
3.2. Data 
Our work uses a panel data set based on  monthly balance sheet information that the Swiss 
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) and the SNB jointly collect for supervisory 
purposes. For our baseline regressions, our sample period starts 18 months before the 
introduction of negative rates in Switzerland (July 2013) and ends 18 months thereafter (June 
2016). This allows us to study symmetric pre- and post-treatment periods and to contrast our 
results with those for a similar period around an earlier rate cut in August 2011. 
Data are available for all “[b]anks whose balance sheet total and fiduciary business combined 
exceed CHF 150 million and whose balance sheet total amounts to at least CHF 100 million”.18 
Of the 237 banks that originally satisfy these criteria, we retain 68 banks that satisfy FINMA’s 
definition of retail banks, which is used for internal peer group analysis.19 This definition 
demands that banks generate at least 55% of their income from balance-sheet effective 
activities on average during the three years preceding June 2013. 20  The relevant income 
components include net interest income and fees on loans, as opposed to advisory fees and 
trading income. The criterion primarily eliminates WM banks, which derive most income from 
advisory fees. This has three important advantages: First, it helps us to address the simultaneity 
of the negative interest rate and exchange rate shocks. While WM banks’ costs in CHF 
                                                             
18 http://snb.ch/en/emi/MONAX  
19 Notice that this definition is different from the SNB’s definition of retail banks, which takes into account banks’ ownership structure. We 
believe that a classification based on business models is preferable for our purposes, also because it provides us with a larger sample size. We 
worked with the SNB’s definition in an earlier version of this paper and found our results to be qualitatively robust. 
20 June 2013 is the last month before the start of our pre-treatment period. Income shares, however, are stable so that the group composition 
would remain unchanged if we chose a different selection date. 
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remained unaffected by the exchange rate, their fee income–which foreign clients typically pay 
in their home currencies–decreased. We would thus expect a drop in fee income for WM banks, 
and we would expect it to be more pronounced when the fraction of foreign clients is larger. 
For retail banks, instead, foreign currency assets and liabilities constitute a negligible fraction 
of the balance sheet (the pooled sample averages are 2.73% and 4.38%). Second, the focus on 
retail banks also alleviates concerns about the predictability of the exemption threshold and the 
plausibility of the parallel trend assumption. Since WM banks hold fewer short-term liabilities, 
they face systematically lower MRR and higher exposed reserves. Because it is harder to argue 
in this case that exposure to negative rates was unpredictable, including WM banks could 
challenge our identifying assumption. Third, we also believe that focusing on retail banks 
improves the external validity of our analysis. WM banks are a product of their institutional 
environment and may offer more limited insights beyond Switzerland. Retail banks, with 
deposit and mortgage ratios of around 70%, instead, have counterparts in many countries.21 
Besides WM banks, the income-based definition of retail banks also eliminates the universal 
banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, as well as other more trading-focused banks. Cooperative banks 
do not enter our sample either, as they hold reserves at a shared clearing bank. 
We also drop from our sample banks that are foreign-owned. Of all retail banks they have the 
largest currency mismatch, and may thus exploit links with their foreign owners when they 
adjust their balance sheets, who–in turn–might adjust their behavior to the simultaneously 
changing exchange rate. Finally, we drop from our sample all banks that are not present 
throughout the 36 months of our baseline period and the 36 months of our reference period 
(February 2010 to January 2013). As a result, we are left with 50 banks and a perfectly balanced 
panel of (50*36 =) 1,800 bank-month observations. Regulatory risk measures are available at 
quarterly frequency, so that our risk analysis, from 2013Q1 to 2016Q2, is based on 600 bank-
quarter observations. Our profitability analysis, instead, relies on semi-annual data and 300 
bank-time observations (2013H2 to 2016H2). 
                                                             
21 Despite these caveats, we also provide supplementary analyses of the effects on WM banks, and thereby a more comprehensive picture of 
the entire Swiss banking sector. 
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Table 1 provides pooled summary statistics. Table A1 (Online Appendix) provides statistics 
for the pre- and post-treatment periods, separately for banks experiencing treatment intensity 
below (Panel A) and at or above (Panel B) the sample median. Summary statistics are provided 
for different balance sheet items, as well as for income and risk-taking measures. The average 
bank in our sample invests 72.78% of total assets in mortgages, 8.49% in uncollateralized 
loans, and 4.70% in financial assets. Liquid assets amount to 8.34% and are dominated by 
central bank reserves (7.77% of total assets). On the liability side, deposit funding constitutes 
the largest fraction (67.59%), followed by bond funding (13.04%). The sample banks hold few 
assets in foreign currency (2.73%) and raise 95.62% of their funding in CHF. They exceed 
their risk-weighted capital requirement by 8.21% of risk-weighted assets on average and hold 
a weakly negative net position on the interbank market (-0.86% of total assets). The share of 
their required equity attributed to credit risk amounts to 94%, and is significantly higher than 
the shares attributed to market (1%) or operational risk (6%).22 In short, we focus on simple 
retail banks that deal primarily with local households and small firms. They are well capitalized 
and their main exposure stems from traditional banking services, such as credit provision and–
to a lesser extent–maturity transformation. 
Next, we consider the change in average sample characteristics from the period before January 
2015 to the period of and after that month (Table A1). We observe that the average bank held 
a larger share of liquid assets in the period after January 2015 and fewer claims on other banks. 
Banks also generated less net interest and fee income, invested in safer portfolios and more 
strongly exceeded their regulatory capital requirement. Because of the simultaneous exchange 
rate shock and because banks were differentially affected by the SNB’s policy, however, these 
changes cannot be attributed directly to negative interest rates. To isolate the marginal effect 
of negative interest rates on banks, we need to compare banks with different degrees of 
exposure. Table A1, for banks with treatment intensity below (Panel A) and at or above (Panel 
B) the median, provides first insights.23 We observe an increase in average SNB reserves in 
both groups, but the change is significantly stronger in Panel A (from 4.06% to 9.14%, 
                                                             
22 We use those values that FINMA and SNB collect and report for regulatory purposes. Notice that required equity is calculated before 
deductions, so that individual fractions (or the sum of different fractions) can exceed 100%. 
23 We do not report summary statistics for groups above and below the exemption threshold to maintain equal group size. As can be seen in 
Figure 4, the group of banks with positive levels of exposed reserves is smaller, implying that subsample statistics would be less reliable. 
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compared to a change from 8.30% to 9.59%). At the same time, the net position on the 
interbank market changes from -0.35% to -2.75 for banks below the median, and from 0.16% 
to -0.51% for those above. For banks below the median, this reflects an arbitrage opportunity. 
Their unused exemption allows these banks to deposit more interest-exempt reserves at the 
central bank while charging a negative rate on loans from other banks. When exposed reserves 
are above the median, instead, the group consists of banks with both positive and negative 
levels of exposed reserves. It is therefore plausible that Panel B exhibits a qualitatively 
identical, but weaker change in ratios. Consistently, we also observe that below-median banks 
reduce the share of mortgages on their balance sheet from 74.81% to 72.89%, while above-
median banks do not reduce it significantly. Uncollateralized loans, instead, are cut from 
10.28% to 8.95% for below-median banks, while they change from 7.65% to 7.09% for those 
above the median. 
While these observations are suggestive, they are not entirely conclusive; e.g. because the 
group with reserves above the sample median in December 2014 mixes banks with positive 
and negative levels of exposed reserves. Next, we therefore proceed with a more in-depth 
regression analysis. 
3.3. Identification 
To identify the effect of marginally higher negative rate exposure on banks’ investment and 
funding choices and the corresponding implications for income and risk-taking, we rely on a 
Difference-in-Difference design. Our treatment period is characterized by a dummy variable 
(Postt) that is equal to one from January 2015 and zero before.
24 Treatment intensity, instead, 
is defined as the level of SNB reserves in December 2014, minus the bank-specific exemption 
and relative to total assets (TA). For each bank i, we refer to this variable as Exposed Reserves 
(ERi): 
                                                             
24 As previously discussed we use quarterly data when we analyse the effect on risk-taking and semi-annual data when we study bank income. 
Treatment period dummies in these cases are equal to one for all quarters (semesters) following and including 2015Q1 (2015H1), and zero 
before. When we compare our results to an earlier reference period, with a rate cut in positive interest rate territory, our treatment dummy is 
equal to one for all months following and including August 2011. 
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We use a continuous treatment variable because banks were affected by negative rates to many 
different degrees (rather than in a binary fashion). An unreported robustness check with a 
binary treatment indicator, however, for which we compare banks with treatment intensity 
above and below the sample median, generates consistent results. 
Denoting a generic dependent variable in period t as Yi,t, our benchmark model is: 
.   (1) 
The coefficient of interest, δ, captures the difference in the pre-post change of the dependent 
variable, between banks with different levels of exposed reserves, or more intuitively: the effect 
of a stronger negative rate exposure on Yi,t. It is worth mentioning that our definition of the 
treatment variable assumes the same relationship between Yi,t and ERi for positive and negative 
levels of ERi. This is because a marginal unit of ERi has the same (opportunity) cost for banks 
with ERi < 0 as it has for banks with ERi > 0. While the latter pay more negative interest to the 
SNB if ERi is larger, additional reserves reduce the unused exemption for the former. This 
exemption, however, could be used to borrow at an interbank rate of approximately -75bps 
while depositing at the SNB for free. 
Building on Model (1), we consider several extensions: First, for our main regression, we 
saturate the model with bank and time fixed effects (FE) to control for time-invariant, bank-
specific heterogeneity and for period-specific factors: 
.    (2) 
Next, to capture not only the average treatment effect for the post-treatment period, we also 
estimate month-by-month effects. To this end, we interact our treatment variable with dummy 
variables for 35 of the 36 sample months, using July 2013 as the reference date: 
ERi =
SNB Reservesi,12/2014 -SNB Exemptioni,2014
Total Assetsi,12/2014
Yi,t =a +b ×ERi +g ×Postt +d × ERi ´Postt( )+ei,t
Yi,t =aˆ +dˆ × ERi ´Postt( )+FEi +FEt +ui,t
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.   (3) 
The coefficients of interest (δ’s) provide evidence of the difference in the inter-temporal change 
in Yi,t between our initial sample date and each subsequent month. Over the 17 pre-treatment 
months this constitutes an implicit placebo test, which should return insignificant interaction 
effects under the parallel trends assumption. Over the 18 post-treatment months, instead, Model 
(3) provides additional insights into the evolution of the negative rate effect over time. We 
estimate our models using ordinary least squares and cluster our standard errors at the bank 
level (Bertrand et al., 2004). 
A central identifying assumption of our setup is that–absent negative rates–time trends in the 
dependent variables would be parallel for banks with different levels of exposed reserves. To 
support this assumption, we plot the distribution of exposed reserves as of December 2014 in 
Figure 4. The fact that it is reasonably smooth and symmetric around the average level of ERi 
(-5.76%), suggests that neither banks nor the SNB targeted specific cut-off levels.25 In addition, 
the availability of monthly data for all balance sheet items allows us to estimate and plot, in 
Figures 5-7, the monthly DiD coefficients from Model (3) for the 35 months following July 
2013, and thereby to demonstrate the absence of significant effects prior to treatment. The 
evidence supports the parallel trends assumption required for the validity of our DiD design 
and also suggests that we do not need to condition on additional control variables. We can thus 
study the effects on a wide range of dependent variables and abstract from concerns related to 
the estimation of dynamic panels. 
Another challenge to our identification arises from the removal of the exchange rate peg that 
occurred simultaneously with the implementation of negative interest rates in Switzerland. The 
unpegging came as a surprise to financial markets and led to heavy losses among currency 
traders betting on a depreciation of the CHF. Their losses transmitted to direct brokers, both 
foreign and domestic, who had financed the traders’ bets with Lombard Loans.26 This could be 
                                                             
25 The sample median is -6.3% of total assets. 
26 See, for example, “Swiss central bank moves to negative deposit rate” (Financial Times; 18.12.2014) and “Swiss franc storm claims scalp 
of top FOREX broker “ (Financial Times; 20.01.2015), where the latter is referring to a UK entity. 
Yi,t =a '+ d 's× ERi ´FEs( )
s=08/2013
06/2016
å +FEi +FEt +ei,t
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problematic if the losses were systematically related to exposed reserves, e.g. because direct 
brokers have lower deposit ratios. In response to this challenge, we do not include direct 
brokers in our sample and focus entirely on domestically owned retail banks. We further isolate 
our analysis from exchange rate exposure by excluding internationally active WM and 
universal banks. For retail banks themselves, the exchange rate shock could have mattered 
insofar as the more export-oriented of their corporate clients may have suffered from reductions 
in competitiveness. With hindsight, these clients have coped well, aided by tax-financed 
schemes to support shorter working hours and by the international price setting power of many 
Swiss exporters.27 For this channel to affect our conclusions, it would, in any case, be necessary 
that differences in the demand from corporates are correlated with banks’ exposed reserves. 
A third identification challenge arises if the treatment of one bank in our sample affects the 
behavior of other–differently treated–banks. Since our sample covers about 27% of the Swiss 
mortgage market, and does not include any of the banks with significant market share, we are 
confident that individual treatment does not affect market conditions for other banks in the 
same market.  
For additional robustness, we re-run Models (1) and (2) using alternative treatment definitions. 
First, we consider the difference between total liquid assets required of each bank in 2015 and 
the Swiss exemption threshold, scaled by total assets (LCR Disti): 
 
Total Liquid Assets Required refers to the regulatory requirement under the liquidity coverage 
ratio (LCR) of Basel III. It amounted to 60% of predicted Total Net Outflows in 2015, and was 
designed to increase by 10 percentage points annually thereafter, until the conclusion of the 
Basel III phase-in in 2019, when liquid assets will be required to cover at least 100% of net 
outflows. Total Net Outflows are bank-specific and based on a 30-day liquidity stress scenario. 
                                                             
27 
To avoid bankruptcies or heavy losses of employers, as well as lay-offs in the face of temporarily lower demand for a firm’s products, 
short-term work schemes had employees work only e.g. 50% of regular hours but receive 80% of their full wage, where the difference was 
paid by the government. For the government this was cheaper than the unemployment benefits due if the person were laid off entirely. See for 
example https://www.ch.ch/en/short-time-work/. 
LCR Dist i =
Total Liquid Assets Requiredi,2015 -SNB Exemptioni,2014
Total Assetsi,12/2014
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Higher predicted net outflows result in higher liquidity requirements and, since banks cover 
most of these with SNB reserves, provide us with a second proxy for negative rate exposure. 
Our results are robust to using LCR Disti.  
We also replicate our analysis using the sum of ERi and banks’ net interbank exposure in 
December 2014, relative to the exemption and scaled by total assets, as treatment variable. 
Since central bank reserves and interbank loans are close substitutes and the 3-month LIBOR 
rate is, in fact, the SNB’s target interest rate, the sum of both values provides an alternative–
although potentially more confounded–measure of bank's total exposure to monetary policy.28 
We find all results to be qualitatively robust. An added benefit of this treatment is that it 
facilitates the comparison with a rate cut in positive territory. Absent any interest on reserves 
at the time, and hence of any exemption, we use the sum of Excess Reserves (reserves 
exceeding the MRR) and net interbank exposure in July 2011 as treatment variable for this 
reference period. 
4. Results 
Next, we proceed to discuss our main results. We begin by documenting the direct and indirect 
costs of negative rates, where the latter are owed primarily to the ZLB on deposits. Section 4.1 
shows how banks reallocate SNB reserves, which are directly treated with negative rates, to 
the interbank market. Subsequently, Section 4.2 identifies a stronger reduction in long-term 
bond financing for relatively more exposed banks, but–due to their reluctance to levy negative 
rates on depositors–not in short-term deposits. This implies a stronger maturity mismatch, since 
long-term liabilities are reduced along with short-term reserves, and a stronger increase in 
average funding costs. Section 4.3 then analyzes the effect on income. We find evidence of 
direct and indirect costs, but–maybe surprisingly–no negative effect on the net profitability of 
more exposed (retail) banks. This is due to the growth in fee and net interest income. Section 
4.4 further explores the effect on loan shares and thereby risk-taking. Section 4.5 compares our 
                                                             
28 Figure 4 also provides the distribution of ERi + NIBi in December 2014 across banks. 
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results to the effect of an earlier rate cut within positive territory. In Section 5, we discuss 
extensions and robustness checks. 
4.1. The Reallocation of SNB Reserves 
We first document the reallocation of SNB reserves through the interbank market. Under the 
Swiss NIRP, banks with ERi > 0 were charged negative interest, while those with ERi < 0 could 
still deposit reserves at the SNB for free. Because changes in banks’ cash position were also 
charged negative interest, reallocation of liquidity via the interbank market was an expected 
outcome and presumably intended to ensure transmission of the negative rate to the interbank 
market. 
Table 2 provides the corresponding results. It shows that for banks with one standard deviation 
larger ERi in December 2014, the balance sheet share of SNB reserves is reduced by 
(0.55*4.3% =) 2.37 percentage points (pp) more on average over the subsequent 18 months.  
Over the same period, the share of TA invested in net interbank loans for such banks is 
increased by an additional 1.12pp. When we consider year-on-year growth rates of our 
dependent variables, we also find more strongly reduced growth of liquid assets and more 
accelerated growth of interbank lending among relatively more exposed banks.29 
Beyond the average effect for the post-treatment period, Figure 5 plots coefficients and 
confidence intervals for the interaction terms (ERi*month dummy) in Model 3. For all 17 
months preceding the policy change, the change relative to the levels of July 2013 does not 
depend on ERi, which supports our parallel trends assumption. By contrast, a significantly 
negative (positive) coefficient after the policy change means that banks with relatively higher 
ERi reduced their SNB reserves (increased their net interbank exposure) more, as a share of 
total assets. We observe that the differences occur already during the initial months after the 
introduction of negative deposit facility rates, but persist afterwards. 
                                                             
29 Our model has limited explanatory power for year-on-year growth rates, as these are generally noisier than balance sheet shares. To indicate 
whether the nominator or denominator of the balance sheet shares drive our findings, we report them nonetheless, but allocate less weight to 
them in our interpretations than to the effects on scaled balance sheet positions. 
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Since Swiss retail banks tend to have high deposit ratios and low levels of reserves, most banks 
in our benchmark sample held SNB reserves below their exemptions in December 2014 (Figure 
4). They could therefore increase their net borrowing on the interbank market at up to -75bps 
and freely deposit the additional liquidity at the SNB until their own exemption was exhausted. 
Just as a negative deposit facility rate would constitute a negative income shock for banks with 
positive ERi, it can thus be thought of as a positive income shock for most banks in our sample. 
To be able to identify the marginal effect of negative interest exposure, however, it is only 
required that the impact of more exposed reserves is independent of the sign of ERi. This is 
confirmed by qualitatively similar results for WM banks with–on average–positive exposed 
reserves (Section 5.1). 
That we expect to observe effects beyond the reallocation of liquidity from exposed to exempt 
SNB accounts has two reasons: First, the sum of all exemptions was–by design–not large 
enough to absorb all excess liquidity. Second, the overnight and 3-month interbank rates 
adjusted quickly to the negative rate and even the 12-month interbank rate turned and remained 
negative (Figure 1). Since changes in cash holdings were also charged negative interest under 
the SNB’s NIRP, banks were thus forced to respond in one of two ways: by allocating the 
remaining excess liquidity somewhere more profitable and more risky, or by incurring negative 
rates while finding ways to compensate for the higher costs. Next, we therefore investigate the 
effect of negative rate exposure on other balance sheet items. 
4.2. Balance Sheet Shortening, Funding Choices and the Zero Lower Bound 
Table 3 studies banks’ response to negative rate exposure on the liability side of the balance 
sheet. To start with, Columns (1) and (7) show for regressions first without and then with bank 
and month fixed effects that banks with higher initial ERi did not reallocate all money 
withdrawn from the SNB into other assets, but also shrank their balance sheets faster. If 
exposed reserves were one standard deviation higher in December 2014, banks reduced the 
growth rate of total assets (TA) by 1.03pp more over the 18 post-treatment months. For our 
results on different balance sheet items, for which we typically consider ratios relative to total 
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assets, it follows that we estimate negative effects conservatively. At the same time, negative 
asset growth potentially inflates positive coefficients. 
With this in mind, Table 3 then illustrates how banks’ reluctance to charge negative deposit 
rates causes them to reduce their size not only by the reduction in net interbank funding (Table 
2), but also by deleveraging via non-deposit liabilities, such as longer-term bonds. Specifically, 
banks with one sd lower ERi reduced the growth rate of bond funding by an additional 2.24pp, 
on average over the period until July 2016; as a share of total assets, they cut bond funding by 
an additional 0.60pp. Notably, this deleveraging via bonds–and not deposits–occurs although 
pass-through to the bond market remained largely intact, so that bond financing was in fact a 
cheaper source of funding.30 
In contrast, we find the pre- to post-treatment changes in banks’ cash bond, deposit and 
common equity shares to be more positive the more exposed banks are to negative rates. Since 
we find no statistically significant evidence that more affected banks adjusted the growth rates 
of these liabilities differently than less affected banks, the impact on balance sheet shares 
appears to be driven primarily by the reduction in bond financing and thus in total assets. 
Reducing in particular the deposit intake accordingly, by charging a negative deposit rate, 
appears to have been prohibitively unattractive; even if a larger deposit share implied higher 
average funding costs and, as we will show below, increases in maturity mismatch and resulting 
interest rate risk. Conversations with practitioners suggest that this is due to depositors being 
particularly sensitive to negative interest and–at the same time–perceived as potential mortgage 
borrowers, investors, and as providers of stable funding who might be difficult to win back 
once lost.31 
Figure 6 plots coefficients from Model 3 and illustrates that the response of the deposit ratio to 
negative rate exposure is immediate, mirroring the quick response of interbank funding (Figure 
                                                             
30 For most banks in our sample, bond funding consists mainly of covered bonds, which are formally guaranteed by the bank (and implicitly 
secured by its borrowers and their collateral) and which are issued by “Pfandbriefzentrale” for cantonal banks and by “Pfandbriefbank” for 
other banks,. From 2015 onward, these bonds paid nominal rates down to 0 for maturities of 5 years and were typically issued at prices larger 
than 100%, implying an effectively negative annual return (see, for example, the Annual Reports for 2015 and 2016 at 
www.pfandbriefbank.ch). Figure 1 also illustrates the evolution of interest rates on covered and bank bonds with longer, 8-year maturity, and 
shows even these longer maturity bonds crossing into negative territory in late 2015 and 2016. 
31 That banks use excess liquidity to retire their liabilities resembles a result in Demiralp et al. (2017), according to which investment banks 
cut back wholesale funding under negative rates. 
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5). The share of bond financing, instead, reacts more sluggishly. We return to the analysis of 
banks’ funding choices in Section 4.3, when we consider bank-level evidence on income and 
interest rates. Yet, we can already conclude that negative rate exposure induces banks to more 
strongly reduce funding by publicly traded, long-term bonds.  
4.3. Interest and Fee Income, and an Explanation for higher Mortgage Rates  
Interest Income. In Table 4, we study semi-annual income statements and find overall interest 
payments to drop less for more exposed banks: ERi that are one sd larger in December 2014 
cause the year-on-year growth of interest paid to drop 2.92pp less in response to negative policy 
rates. Similarly, interest expenses in % of TA drop 0.09pp less in response to an additional sd 
of exposed reserves. Beyond the negative rates on exposed SNB reserves and in the interbank 
market, this can be explained by the reorganization of banks’ liability structure, i.e. the lower 
share of bond funding and the implied increase in the fraction of–relatively more expensive–
deposit funding. 
Likely in response to these higher funding costs, we also find that interest earned was cut less 
for more exposed banks, both in terms of year-on-year growth and relative to total assets. Since 
the growth rate of net interest income (NII) does not change significantly more or less for more 
exposed banks, while profitability (NII/TA) actually increases more, the additional income 
apparently suffices to compensate for higher average funding costs. 
Next, we turn to analyzing how more affected banks managed to have their interest income 
decrease by less than the more weakly affected banks. As reported, for example in Bech and 
Malkhozov (2016), Swiss banks on average increased their mortgage rates after the 
introduction of the NIRP. To understand the drivers of this development better, we investigate 
whether interest rates increased differently for banks that are differentially exposed to negative 
rates, i.e. whether we can establish a causal link between the SNB’s NIRP and the increase in 
mortgage rates. More specifically, we analyze bank-level reference rates, which are drawn 
from reports submitted to the SNB and reflect offered rates. For liabilities these rates typically 
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coincide with actual rates.32 For loans and mortgages, instead, the reported rates represent 
averages, and de facto rates may vary with borrowers’ risk characteristics. Indeed, we find that 
interest rates for fixed rate mortgages have been raised relatively more by more exposed banks. 
So far, we have established that relatively higher interest income plays an important role in 
banks’ compensation of the relatively larger interest expenses implied by negative policy rates. 
We have also established that at least part of this compensation can be attributed to more 
exposed banks reducing their mortgage rates less than more weakly affected banks (as opposed 
to a stronger expansion in loan volumes). Next, we explore the factors that contributed to these 
higher mortgage rates in more detail. The key driver seems to be the relatively higher cost of 
funding mortgages. Although the interbank and swap rates that are usually used to compute 
mortgage margins dropped by almost the same margin as the reserve rate, banks’ average 
funding costs dropped significantly less, as banks did not dare to cut deposit rates into the 
negative. This effect is further reinforced for more affected banks as they (a) also increased the 
share of deposit funding more than less affected banks, and (b) cut their sight deposit, time 
deposit and cash bond rates less (Table 5). We attribute the last effect to the fact that more 
affected banks tend to be banks with a historically lower dependence on deposit funding, and 
thus with lower minimum reserve requirements, lower NIRP exemptions, and higher ERi. 
Hence these banks started out with deposit rates already closer to zero, implying that they had 
less leeway to lower them before hitting the ZLB.33 
Offering an additional rationale for higher funding costs, and thus for incentives to raise 
mortgage rates, some banks have suggested an increase in the costs of hedging interest rate risk 
through swaps.34 In such deals, a bank would typically agree to pay its counter-party the fixed 
long-term rate, which it receives from its mortgage borrowers, in return for a short-term rate, 
typically the CHF LIBOR. Once interbank rates go negative however, so would the received 
                                                             
32 Only a few very large customers may sometimes get individual deals. 
33 Figures 5-7, and analogous Figures for further outcomes available on demand, show that this intuitive correlation of ERi with initial deposit 
funding and initial deposit rates did not disturb the parallel trends assumption in our baseline sample of only domestically owned retail banks. 
Through bank fixed effects, we further control for differences in initial conditions in all of our regressions. While this supports our claim that 
we are capturing the causal impact of negative rate exposure, the concern remains that the channel through which this treatment manifests, 
consists of both the direct cost on reserves and interbank exposure and the differences in initial deposit rates. Robustness checks in Table A8 
(Online Appendix) therefore display a “horse race” between treatment intensities measured by ERi and by initial deposit rates. While both 
channels seem to be relevant, the results confirm that ERi appears to matter more. 
34 https://www.nzz.ch/finanzen/das-raetsel-der-gestiegenen-hypothekarsaetze-1.18481102; accessed: January 26, 2018 
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short-term rate, implying that the bank would end up paying on both legs of the swap deal. To 
test if this mechanism indeed contributes to higher mortgage rates, we exploit supervisory data 
that inform us, in a binary fashion, which bank used interest rate swaps in December 2014.35 
Our results in Table 6 do not find that interest rate swap use leads to smaller drops in banks’ 
mortgage rates. If anything we observe that banks using interest rate swaps respond to negative 
reserve rates with larger mortgage rate drops. A possible explanation is that the differential 
funding adjustments reported above have increased the importance of interest rate risk, which 
we also analyze below, an issue banks already using interest rate swaps could better deal with 
than those not using any interest rate swaps. 
A second potential contributor to higher mortgage rates could be the use of market power, 
which might allow banks to respond to a given increase in funding costs with a more significant 
expansion of their interest income. In Table A3 (Online Appendix) we therefore test whether 
banks with more market power indeed manage to generate additional interest income. To this 
end, we use that many banks are only active in some of the 26 Swiss cantons, so that we can 
treat each canton as a separate mortgage market.36 For each market, we then compute the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) and assign to each bank a weighted average, with weights 
equal to the bank’s allocation of mortgages across cantons.37 We find some evidence that banks 
operating in more concentrated markets, i.e. with higher average HHI, decrease their NII less 
in response to the Swiss NIRP. We observe this on average, but also, in particular, for banks 
that are relatively more exposed. The effect, however, disappears when we add bank and time 
fixed effects. Focusing on this more complete specification, we observe that operating in more 
concentrated markets mitigates the effects of negative rate exposure: more affected banks cut 
interest paid and earned less than less affected banks, but more if their weighted HHI is higher. 
Similarly, market power also appears to help more exposed banks to increase their net fee 
income more. Rather than allowing banks to raise interest rates more, it therefore appears that 
banks with more market power manage to cut their funding costs more and raise more fee 
income, and–consequently–need not raise their interest income as much. To us, this suggests 
                                                             
35 Results are robust to measuring who used interest rate swaps in September 2014 rather than in December 2014. 
36 Treating cantons as separate mortgage markets is common practice among practitioners in Switzerland. 
37 See Table A3 (Online Appendix) for more detail. 
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that higher funding costs are indeed an important determinant of the increase in mortgage rates: 
the better banks are able to mitigate the impact on funding costs, the less do they need to raise 
their lending rates. 
A third possible explanation for higher mortgage rates is that more affected banks chose to 
incur more credit risk in their mortgage lending and hence charged higher risk premiums. While 
our section on risk-taking below finds evidence of increases in bank risk-taking in multiple 
dimensions, we find no clear evidence specifically of more credit risk in mortgage lending. 
This is, in part because only higher loan-to-value ratios, but not higher payment-to-income 
ratios or other risk indicators, are reflected in regulatory risk-weights under the standardized 
approach in Switzerland. In addition, we also only observe the average risk-weight across all 
asset categories, but not the risk-weights specifically for banks’ mortgage portfolio. 
Finally, it has also been suggested that longer-term rates were driven up by increasing demand 
from consumers who tried to lock in low mortgage rates.38 While this may explain why banks 
raised mortgage rates relatively more for longer maturities, it cannot account for relatively 
larger increases among more exposed banks, and across all maturities. 
Fee Income. The second important observation in Table 4 is that relatively more affected banks 
manage to increase their fee income more. ERi that are one sd larger lead to a growth rate of 
net fee income that is 2.80pp higher, and to a pre- to post-treatment change in the ratio of net 
fee income over total business volume that is 0.73pp larger. Fees are not only levied on 
depositors but also accrue from lending-related services. As with our results on interest 
expenditure, Table A4 (Online Appendix) suggests that it is easier for banks operating in more 
concentrated markets to pass on their costs to depositors: net fee income increases more for 
these banks, while there is no differential effect on loan-related fees. 
Overall, our results suggest that retail banks have been able to compensate for the cost of 
relatively higher exposed reserves through higher interest and fee income. This is different 
                                                             
38 https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/03/07/2155458/the-swiss-banking-response-to-nirp-increase-interest-rates/; accessed: November 05, 2017 
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from the response of the lead arrangers in Heider et al. (2017) that seem to adjust neither 
lending rates nor fees. 
4.4. Lending and Risk-Taking 
Ex-ante, our results on the restructuring of banks’ liabilities yield ambiguous predictions about 
banks’ risk-taking incentives: on the one hand, a stronger increase in the balance sheet share 
of equity funding suggests a more strongly reduced risk appetite for more exposed banks (e.g. 
due to reduced incentives for risk-shifting). On the other hand, a stronger increase in the 
balance sheet share of insured deposit funding, implies steeper growth in average funding 
costs, as well as more strongly reduced monitoring. To identify the net effect on risk-taking, 
we focus on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets in Table 7, and investigate the effects of 
negative rate exposure on credit and interest rate risk in Table 8. 
We find that for banks whose ERi were one sd larger in December 2014, the balance sheet 
shares of uncollateralized loans increased by an extra 0.60pp, the share of mortgages increased 
by additional 0.69pp, and the share of financial assets increased by an extra 0.26pp. From also 
studying the effects on year-on-year growth rates, we conclude that this portfolio rebalancing 
is largely the result of banks reducing the share of safe and liquid assets, i.e. of those assets on 
which they are charged negative rates. Since central bank deposits are risk free and receive a 
regulatory risk weight of zero, we show in Table 8 that these changes lead to an increase in the 
ratio of risk-weighted over total assets. The corresponding coefficients for the year-on-year 
growth of risk-weighted assets are positive as well, but not significant at conventional levels. 
As a result, our bank-level data are inconclusive as to whether risk-weighted assets indeed 
increase more for more exposed banks, or if this is only true in proportion to banks’ total assets. 
This makes it difficult to know, whether banks expand lending to riskier borrowers (as in 
Heider et al., 2017), or whether the changes in balance sheet shares are driven by reductions in 
safe/liquid assets (Table 2). More specifically, Panel B states that a higher ERi in December 
2014 (by one sd) would lead to an increase in the ratio of risk-weighted over total assets that is 
1.51pp higher over the post-treatment period. Since this increase in average risk-weights must 
ultimately be the main driver behind the erosion of regulatory capital buffers (i.e. the difference 
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between CET1/RWA and the supervisory intervention threshold) in Table 3, we can infer that 
risk-weights grow relatively more for more affected banks, which would suggest that–at least 
part of–the increase in the risk-weight density is due to riskier loans. Independent of being fully 
able to disentangle the two channels, however, our results show that more exposed banks did 
not cut risky lending in proportion with their safe asset holdings, so that they allowed average 
portfolio risk to increase more strongly than less exposed banks. 
Next, we observe that shares of required capital attributed to market and operational risk 
increase more for more exposed banks. While operational risk is negligible for the banks in our 
sample, the effect on capital requirements due to market risk reflects primarily the increase in 
the relative importance of financial assets and uncollateralized loans. It does not reflect the 
increase in interest rate risk since higher interest rate risk did not lead to higher Pillar I capital 
requirements in Switzerland throughout our sample period. 
At the same time, however, Table 8 also shows a stronger increase in interest rate risk for more 
affected banks. This increase reflects that more affected banks have partly replaced highly 
liquid SNB reserves with longer-maturity mortgages, whereas on the liability side they have 
partly replaced funding through longer-maturity covered bonds with funding through shorter-
maturity deposits. Columns (6) to (9) document the effect on changes in bank value, relative 
to equity, which FINMA predicts in response to increasing market rates. The different 
measures are calculated using detailed information on the maturity of banks’ assets and 
liabilities. For those balance sheet items with unspecified maturities (e.g. deposits), however, 
assumptions need to be made: in columns (6) and (7) banks’ own assumptions on effective 
maturity are used for positions in CHF and foreign currency respectively; column (8) uses the 
average assumption across all banks in a given quarter, and column (9) uses a time- and bank-
invariant assumption of two years. 
The only measure of interest rate risk for which we identify a stronger decrease among more 
exposed banks concerns the interest rate risk in foreign currency. This follows from banks 
substituting some of their CHF liquidity with liquidity in other currencies, which incurs less or 
no negative rates. As a result, the average maturity of their FX assets and hence the maturity 
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mismatch decreases within the foreign currency part of their balance sheet. All other measures, 
however, confirm that interest rate risk increases more for more exposed banks. 
4.5. Positive Interest Rate Environment 
To compare the transmission of monetary policy under positive and negative rates, we analyze 
banks’ response to a rate cut within positive territory in August 2011. Since there was no 
interest on reserves and no exemption at the time, we use the sum of reserves and net interbank 
lending in July 2011 as alternative treatment variable. To facilitate the comparison across rate 
cuts, we then adjust our treatment variable for the negative rate period by adding net interbank 
exposure in December 2014 to ERi. While this makes identification more difficult because 
exposure to interbank rates is more easily predictable, this setup helps us to shed light on the 
peculiarities of negative rate transmission. 
Unlike in our benchmark analysis, the results in Table 9 show no differential effect on asset 
growth in the positive rate regime. They even suggest that more exposed banks may have 
increased their liquid asset holdings, including their central bank reserves, more. This could be 
because no interest was paid on reserves at the time, so that they became relatively more 
attractive due to substitutes becoming more expensive. Loan, mortgage and financial asset 
shares were not differentially affected either, while the deposit ratio increased relatively more 
for more affected banks. The effect on changes in the bond ratio, instead, is negative, but 
notably not significant. Portfolio risk increased more for more exposed banks, although without 
a differential effect on the regulatory cushion, while net fee income seemed to have increased 
less. The results indicate that the nature of monetary policy transmission changes below the 
ZLB and confirm that these differences are likely driven by motives to reallocate costly 
liquidity and to compensate for squeezed interest margins, as well as by the constraint imposed 
by non-negative deposit rates. 
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5. Extensions and Robustness 
5.1. Wealth Management (WM) Banks 
The results in Section 4.3 and work by Nucera et al. (2017), Lucas et al. (forthc.) and Demiralp 
et al. (2017) suggest that the transmission of negative policy rates is not homogeneous across 
banks’ business models. To characterize transmission in Switzerland further, we therefore 
study WM banks, which FINMA defines as banks earning at least 55% of their income through 
fees. 
We excluded WM banks from our baseline results described above because of their 
systematically higher exposure to both the negative reserve rate and the exchange rate. The 
average WM bank has 52% of liabilities and 42% of assets denominated in foreign currencies, 
and likely exhibits a comparable–but to us unobservable–currency mismatch between income 
and costs.39 This threatens the parallel trends assumption and suggests a potential confounding 
of the negative rate effect by exchange rate movements. As an additional argument for focusing 
on retail banks, we also believe that results for this group are more relevant than those for WM 
banks for many other countries. 
The high levels of ERi among WM banks have two reasons: first, high shares of funding with 
maturities longer than three months, which do not contribute to the MRR and thus the negative 
rate exemption.40 Second, large central bank deposits that WM banks hold as part of their 
conservative investment strategy. WM banks also differ from retail banks in that they typically 
have no active mortgage business. They lend to wealth management clients or employees, but 
rarely in the open market. This eliminates returns from (risky) mortgage lending as 
compensation under the negative rate regime. Although these factors make causal identification 
more difficult, we nonetheless provide a descriptive comparison of the inter-temporal changes 
for WM banks. 
                                                             
39 The corresponding values for retail banks are 4.38% and 2.73%. 
40 Money in fiduciary accounts does not enter the balance sheet. 
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In Table 10 we present results based on Model 2. The setup is identical to our benchmark, but 
uses information on 46 WM banks.41  Consistent with our main findings, relatively more 
exposed WM banks withdraw more SNB reserves and reallocate the liquidity towards a 
stronger increase in the balance sheet share of uncollateralized loans. The coefficient on the 
share of financial assets is positive but not significant, while it is effectively zero for mortgages, 
which are usually not part of WM banks’ business model. Although the coefficient is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels, it appears that more exposed WM banks–like 
retail banks–raise their fee income more. Unlike retail banks, however, they also seem to be 
able to reduce their deposit ratio more. This is plausible if one considers the closer relationship 
between WM banks and their customers, and the larger set of securities and off-balance sheet 
vehicles, i.e. of alternative investment opportunities, that they can offer. We also find evidence 
that more affected WM banks increase portfolio risk more from the pre- to the post-treatment 
period, and that they increase their interest rate risk exposure more–specifically with respect to 
foreign currency items (column 10/ Panel B). Both effects, however, are economically 
negligible. 
Notably, our results confirm the patterns of retail banks’ response to negative rates (e.g., the 
allocation of reserves towards larger loan shares and riskier portfolios). This gives us 
confidence that our key insights do not hinge on the negative ERi‘s in our retail bank sample. 
To explore the differences vis-à-vis retail banks further, we also directly compare the two bank 
types. Underlying Table A4 (Online Appendix) is the combined sample, and a setup where the 
more exposed WM banks form the treatment, and retail banks the control group. The results 
reveal that the average WM bank reduced (increased) the balance sheet share of SNB reserves 
(loans) more than the average retail bank. Consistent with our previous explanation, it also 
reduced its deposit ratio and increased its portfolio risk more. Reflecting the stronger 
international outlook, WM banks substituted more CHF assets and liabilities with foreign 
currency equivalents, which may contribute to the SNB’s presumed intention of moderating 
                                                             
41 Summary statistics are provided in Table A2 (Online Appendix). 
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further CHF appreciation with its NIRP. Gross profits and NII developed more negatively, 
albeit insignificantly, suggesting that WM banks bore an overall larger burden. 
5.2. The role of banks’ capital buffers 
In Section 4.4 we showed that the negative rate motivated more exposed banks to increase their 
mortgage and loan shares more than less exposed banks. This suggests that the reversal rate 
(Brunnermeier & Koby, 2017), defined as the rate below which rate cuts become 
contractionary, was either not crossed by the average bank in our sample, or that forces outside 
the underlying theory were at play. This theory argues that a rate cut may reduce banks’ 
profitability and equity, and thereby impair the ability to lend due to binding capital 
requirements. It is also conceivable, however, that weakly capitalized banks, even if they are 
not at their regulatory constraint, are under more pressure to generate additional income, i.e. to 
compensate via higher interest or fee income. 
To study the role of capital, we interact our DiD coefficient with banks’ capital cushion (= 
CET1 in % of risk-weighted assets, minus the supervisory intervention threshold), prior to 
treatment. We find throughout that the interaction term has the opposite sign as our DiD effect, 
implying that a larger capital cushion mitigates the benchmark effects (Table A5). The 
interaction coefficients in our version with bank and month fixed effects are not statistically 
significant for mortgages, but are significant at the 10% level for loans and financial assets. 
For the former, they suggest that banks with smaller capital cushions increase loan shares more. 
Although we focus on balance sheet shares, i.e. on lending as a percentage of total assets, 
because the growth rate of lending per se is too noisy, our results point towards a motive for 
the expansion of bank lending (e.g. the search for yield), rather than towards banks hitting their 
capital constraints and having to restrict lending. The reason may plausibly be that throughout 
our sample banks start out with relatively comfortable capital cushions. 
Finally, Brunnermeier & Koby also argue that banks starting out with larger reserve shares (as 
opposed to risky loans) should have higher reversal rates. For such banks, the rate cut should 
thus be less expansionary. The paper mentions savings and investment banks, but the same 
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reasoning implies a larger expansionary response of lending for retail banks compared to WM 
banks. Yet, our results in Table A4, for what they are worth, imply the opposite. 
5.3. Foreign Currency Exposure 
To supplement our study of banks’ balance sheets, we also explore the effect of negative rate 
exposure on banks’ foreign currency assets and liabilities. In Table A6, the most robust and 
economically most significant effect is a relative expansion of foreign currency liquid assets. 
Higher exposed reserves (by one sd) imply an expansion of FX liquid assets that is 2.15pp 
larger. With domestic currency liquid assets becoming more expensive, banks invest more 
heavily in FX cash and central bank reserves. Our interpretation that this effect is primarily a 
response to the interest rate and not the exchange rate is supported by the relatively weaker 
effect on total FX assets. Instead, we find no significant effect on the shares of total FX deposits 
and liabilities. Overall, we interpret the evidence as supportive of our assumption that retail 
banks are largely isolated from exposure to the SNB’s surprise unpegging of the exchange rate. 
Their main response reflects a substitution from domestic to FX liquid assets. 
5.4. Liquidity Regulation 
Next we proceed to analyze the interaction between monetary policy and Basel III liquidity 
regulation. On the one hand, this serves as a robustness check to our main results (in the form 
of an alternative treatment). On the other hand, it provides insights into the conflicts between 
financial stability objectives and monetary policy. SNB deposits, and similarly liquid assets 
with fast pass-through of the negative rate, account for the majority of liquid assets currently 
held by banks under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) regulation of Basel III.42 This means 
the regulatory requirement to hold sufficient liquidity also increased banks’ exposure to the 
SNB’s NIRP. 
                                                             
42 Under this regulation, banks must simulate a 30-day liquidity stress scenario to predict expected outflows, and then fully cover these 
outflows with “High Quality Liquid Assets” (HQLA), i.e. achieve coverage of liquid assets over net outflows of no less than 100%. This 
regulation entered into force in Switzerland with the adoption of Basel III in 2013, but is being phased in gradually until 2019; the requirement 
for 2015 was equal to 60% in Switzerland. 
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Table A7 uses LCR Disti as alternative treatment variable and investigates its impact on liquid 
assets (Panel A), lending and investment (Panel B), and funding (Panel C).43 Panel A shows 
that banks with higher LCR requirements responded to the negative rates with stronger 
reductions in liquid assets and SNB reserves, and thus also in their LCR. At the same time we 
observe for these banks an increase in the net interbank position that absorbs about half of the 
liquidity withdrawn from the SNB. For the other half, Panel B shows that the same banks have 
also responded with significantly stronger increases in loan, mortgage and financial asset 
shares. Finally, Panel C shows that more heavily treated banks have responded with relatively 
larger decreases in their bond and interbank funding ratios. Conversely and mechanically, the 
balance sheet shares funded with deposits and cash bonds have increased more, with cash bonds 
serving essentially as a longer-maturity version of deposits. 
By and large, the results thus corroborate our main analysis. That negative rates, applicable to 
the most important component of High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) also have induced banks 
to reduce HQLA levels is not surprising. In the present case this has arguably not been 
problematic since Swiss banks had high HQLA levels to start with. Nonetheless it should be 
borne in mind that negative-rate-induced reductions in reserve holdings could become 
problematic if they occur when liquidity is scarce; in particular if banks’ reluctance to charge 
negative deposit rates also causes the balance sheet share of short-term liabilities to increase–
as we have previously documented. 
5.5. Deposit rates in December 2014 
Adding to our robustness checks, we also provide evidence on deposit rates in December 2014 
as a measure of how burdensome the ZLB is for banks: the higher the initial rate, the greater 
banks' ability to lower it before meeting the ZLB. We use the reference rates investigated in 
Section 4.3 for demand and sight deposits, and interact their pre-treatment values with our 
benchmark treatment. A higher deposit rate in December 2014 can then have two effects: on 
the one hand, it allows banks to lower it more and hence moderates the pressure on their 
liability margins. In this case we would expect banks with higher initial deposit rates to respond 
                                                             
43 We use total LCR requirements, as the negative rate was quickly transmitted also to HQLA1 other than SNB reserves, and HQLA2 are 
down-weighted in computing LCR compliance. 
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less strongly along other dimensions. On the other hand, the fact that the bank could not set 
lower deposit rates before might signal limited market power or greater long-term dependence 
on deposits, a constraint that may remain in place also after the drop in interbank rates. In this 
case we would expect a stronger response to the NIRP. 
Focusing on the stronger results in Panel B, where we use both bank and month fixed effects, 
we find that our baseline measure of treatment intensity, ERi,, matters more for the large 
majority of outcomes. The double and triple interactions with the initial demand deposit rate, 
instead, are in most cases not statistically significant. We interpret this as supportive evidence 
for our use of ERi, even if—as explained above—it may be correlated with initial deposit rates. 
Some exceptions to this result, however, are worth discussing in more detail. To start with, we 
find that banks with higher initial deposit rates reduce their SNB reserves less. This is 
consistent with the notion that these banks saw their liability margins squeezed less, as they 
were able to lower their deposit rates relatively more, before hitting the ZLB. In the same vein, 
we find the expansion of loans as a percentage of total assets to be less pronounced for these 
banks, and the expansion of the cash bond share to be stronger. These results confirm our 
hypothesis that the initial deposit rate can act as an additional measure of treatment intensity 
but also suggest that the direct measure via exposed reserves remains significant, even after 
controlling for initial rates. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effects of negative rate exposure on banks’ behavior. We conduct 
a DiD analysis and exploit that negative deposit facility rates in Switzerland were only imposed 
on SNB reserves exceeding 20 times banks’ MRR. Access to detailed supervisory information 
on the universe of banks in Switzerland enables us to provide a complete anatomy of their 
reaction. For identification and to maximize external validity, our baseline estimates focus on 
domestically owned retail banks. For completeness, we also study WM banks, which are more 
specific to the Swiss context, and ensure robustness with respect to alternative treatment 
measures. In addition to the effects on banks’ balance sheets, our findings cover implications 
for profitability, bank-level interest rates and risk-taking. 
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We demonstrate how banks moved liquidity away from costly central bank accounts and 
towards the interbank market as well as towards riskier asset classes, such as uncollateralized 
loans, mortgages and financial assets. Since attractive alternative assets were apparently not 
available for all of the excess liquidity, banks also decided to shorten their balance sheets. This 
was seemingly unattractive to accomplish via reduced deposit funding, as banks feared that a 
full pass-through to depositors might excessively damage their reputation towards current and 
future customers. More NIRP-exposed banks instead chose to reduce their balance sheets by 
retiring their long-term (and largely covered) bond funding, despite negative bond rates making 
these a cheaper source of funding than deposits. The funding cost implications of the self-
imposed ZLB on deposit rates are further aggravated by more exposed banks increasing their 
deposit ratios more and by the fact that more exposed banks also had less leeway to lower their 
deposit rates. 
The partial substitution of central bank reserves, which carry a risk-weight of zero, with 
mortgages, loans and financial assets significantly increased the average risk-weight on banks’ 
assets, a key indicator of credit risk. While average risk-weights increased primarily due to 
portfolio rebalancing, increasing risk-weights ultimately lowered banks’ capital cushions 
relative to regulatory requirements. At the same time, the combination of shifting assets 
towards longer and liabilities towards shorter maturities led to a significant increase in banks’ 
maturity mismatch and thus to interest rate risk. Finally, the negative interest rate on central 
bank reserves, as the most important category of High-Quality Liquid Assets under Basel III’s 
LCR, triggered a reduction in precisely those HQLA and hence in their regulatory LCR. 
Overall, we conclude that the self-imposed ZLB on deposit rates implied a stronger increase in 
overall risk-taking for more exposed banks. 
Different from positive rate environments and from the transmission of negative rates by 
European lead arrangers (Heider et al., 2017), we also find that Swiss retail banks have so far 
managed to maintain–or even increase–their profitability. That this was achieved despite the 
constraint on deposit rates is the result of higher fees on loan- and deposit-related services, as 
well as–less expectedly–of differential increases in mortgage rates. Higher mortgage rates, 
when LIBOR and swap rates as usual measures of refinancing costs had fallen, are potentially 
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counterintuitive. We show, however, that the ZLB on deposit rates caused larger increases of 
average funding costs for more NIRP-exposed banks and that these larger increases in marginal 
costs can account for relatively weaker decreases in the mortgage rates of more affected banks. 
By contrast, we do not find empirical evidence that larger mortgage rate increases were caused 
by higher costs of swap usage, by an expansion towards riskier mortgages, or by higher mark-
ups in cantonal mortgage markets. 
The Swiss NIRP seems to have hurt WM banks more than retail banks, as the former tend to 
hold more reserves and benefit less from exemptions (due to fewer short-term liabilities). This 
could indicate more moderate consequences for aggregate risk-taking, since WM banks are not 
primarily engaged in lending, but may affect the sector via the interbank market. 
Overall, we conclude that monetary policy transmission remained essentially intact and that it 
contributed to the restoring of the interest rate differential between EUR and CHF. At the same 
time, it is clear that the ZLB on household deposits constituted a real constraint, which 
amplified risk-taking with respect to both portfolio composition and maturity mismatch. The 
corresponding side effects, such as the adverse implications for regulatory capital and liquidity 
ratios, need to be considered carefully when contemplating the use of negative interest rates in 
the future. Our results therefore reiterate the importance of financial stability considerations in 
the context of monetary policy design.  
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Appendix 
Figures 
Figure 1. Borrowing Rates 
 
Notes: LEFT PANEL: The Figure illustrates the evolution of short-term interest rates and the Swiss National Bank’s (SNB’s) policy target 
between July 2013 and June 2016. SARON is the average Swiss overnight lending rate; LIBOR (CHF, 3m) and LIBOR (CHF, 12m) are the 
three and twelve month LIBOR rates; Fed. Gov. Bonds (1y) is the return on Swiss Government Bonds with a one-year maturity. RIGHT 
PANEL: The Figure illustrates the evolution of long-term interest rates and the SNB’s policy target between July 2013 and June 2016. Fed. 
Gov. Bonds (8y) is the return on Swiss Government Bonds with an eight-year maturity; Canton Bonds (8y) and Covered Bonds (8y) are the 
average return on Swiss Canton Bonds and Covered Bonds with an eight-year maturity. Bank Bonds (8y) and NFC Bonds (8y) are the average 
return on the bonds of commercial banks and non-financial corporations respectively. The shaded area is the region between the SNB’s upper 
and lower bound for 3-month LIBOR rate, and the grey line is the mean of the upper and lower bound. The vertical line identifies the beginning 
of the treatment period (01/2015). Source: www.snb.ch  
 
 
Figure 2. Liability Margins 
 
Notes: LEFT PANEL: The Figure illustrates the evolution of banks’ overnight liability margin between July 2013 and June 2016. Sight 
Deposit Rate is the average cost of deposit funding; SARON is the average Swiss overnight lending rate. Liability Margin (overnight) is the 
difference between SARON and Sight Deposit Rate. RIGHT PANEL: The Figure illustrates the evolution of banks’ short-term liability margin 
between January 2010 and June 2016. Demand Deposit Rate is the average return on demand deposits; LIBOR (CHF, 3m) is the three-month 
LIBOR rate. Liability Margin (ST) is the difference between LIBOR (CHF, 3m) and Demand Deposit Rate. The vertical line identifies the 
beginning of the treatment period (01/2015). Source: www.snb.ch   
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Figure 3. Asset Margins 
 
Notes: LEFT PANEL: The Figure illustrates the evolution of banks’ short-term asset margin between July 2013 and June 2016. LIBOR (CHF, 
3m) is the three month LIBOR rate; Mortgage Rate (3y, LIBOR) is the average 3-year, adjustable mortgage rate, indexed to the 3-month 
LIBOR rate. Asset Margin (LIBOR) is the difference between Mortgage Rate (LIBOR), i.e. an average adjustable rate mortgage (with rate 
resetting based on the 3-months CHF LIBOR every 3 months and 3 year maturity), and LIBOR (CHF, 3m). RIGHT PANEL: The Figure 
illustrates the evolution of banks’ long-term asset margin between July 2013 and June 2016. Interest Rate Swap (10y) is the swap rate on ten 
year fixed-rate mortgages; Mortgage Rate (10y) is the average 10-year, fixed-rate mortgage rate. Asset Margin (10y) is the difference between 
Mortgage Rate (10y) and Interest Rate Swap (10y). The vertical line identifies the beginning of the treatment period (01/2015). Source: 
www.snb.ch 
 
 
Figure 4. Histogram: Exposed Reserves (Retail Banks) 
 
Notes: The Figure depicts the distribution of all 50 retail banks, across exposed reserves and exposed reserves + net interbank position in 
2014m12. The mean of exposed reserves in our benchmark sample is -5.76%, the median is -6.3% of total assets.   
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Figure 5. Reallocating Liquidity (by month) 
 
Notes: The Figure illustrates the evolution of banks’ SNB reserves (upper panel) and net interbank position (lower panel), both as a fraction 
of total assets, between July 2013 and July 2016, as predicted by our monthly regression coefficients (Model 3). The regression coefficients 
are obtained after controlling for the main/baseline effect each month has had on banks with no exposed reserves. The dotted lines and shaded 
area show the 95% and 90% confidence interval respectively, based on standard errors clustered by bank. The vertical line identifies the 
beginning of the treatment period (01/2015). 
 
Figure 6. Deleveraging (by month) 
 
Notes: The Figure illustrates the evolution of banks’ deposit funding and bond funding (lower panel), both as a fraction of total assets, between 
July 2013 and July 2016, as predicted by our monthly regression coefficients. The regression coefficients are obtained after controlling for the 
main/baseline effect each month has had on banks with no exposed reserves. The dotted lines and shaded area show the 95% and 90% 
confidence interval respectively, based on standard errors clustered by bank. The vertical line identifies the beginning of the treatment period 
(01/2015).   
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Figure 7. Lending (by month) 
 
Notes: The Figure illustrates the evolution of banks’ mortgages and other loans (lower panel), both as a fraction of total assets, between July 
2013 and July 2016, as predicted by our monthly regression coefficients. The regression coefficients are obtained after controlling for the 
main/baseline effect each month has had on banks with no exposed reserves. The dotted lines and shaded area show the 95% and 90% 
confidence interval respectively, based on standard errors clustered by bank. The vertical line identifies the beginning of the treatment period 
(01/2015).   
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Tables 
Table 1. Pooled Summary Statistics 
Notes: The Table shows summary statistics for our pooled sample, covering the 50 domestically owned retail banks that feature in our baseline 
sample over respectively 36 months (balance sheet positions), 6 semesters (income) and 12 quarters (capitalization and risk-taking measures). 
For more details on the sample construction, see Section 3.2, and Table A1 in the Online Appendix.  
  
Variable Obs Banks Periods Mean SD Min Max
Exposed SNB Reserves/TA 1800 50  -5.76 4.30 -12.94 8.75
(Exposed SNB Res + Net IB Pos) / TA 1800 50  -5.92 5.91 -23.41 13.67
Deposits / TA 1800 50  47.60 10.86 24.94 69.61
2015 LCR Req. - Neg. Rate Exemption 1764 49  -0.06 0.03 -0.15 0.00
TA (yoy growth) 1800 50 36 5.12 4.35 -27.01 23.44
All SNB Reserves: % of TA 1800 50 36 7.77 4.17 0.04 27.51
Liquid Assets: % of TA 1800 50 36 8.34 4.09 0.12 28.06
Claims on Banks: % of TA 1800 50 36 2.94 2.41 0.09 14.48
Net Interbank Pos: % of TA 1800 50 36 -0.86 4.39 -16.92 10.07
Loan Assets: % of TA 1800 50 36 8.49 4.23 1.58 22.29
Mortgage Assets: % of TA 1800 50 36 72.78 9.72 32.39 88.69
Fin. Assets: % of TA 1800 50 36 4.70 2.71 0.56 18.42
Deposit Funding: % of TA 1800 50 36 67.59 7.58 39.11 95.99
Bond Funding: % of TA 1800 50 36 13.04 5.58 0.00 25.58
Dues to Banks: % of TA 1764 49 36 3.92 5.04 0.00 24.37
Cash Bond Funding: % of TA 1800 50 36 3.71 3.89 0.00 16.00
FX Share Total Assets 1800 50 36 2.73 3.33 0.01 17.57
FX Share Total Liabilities 1800 50 36 4.38 5.31 0.00 27.75
RWA Density 600 50 12 0.46 0.12 0.02 1.13
Credit Risk Share of Req. Equity 600 50 12 0.94 0.21 0.65 2.56
Market Risk Share of Req. Equity 600 50 12 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.23
OpRisk Share of Req. Equity 600 50 12 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.20
IRR: Bank Ass CHF 600 50 12 -0.06 0.04 -0.19 0.08
IRR: Bank Ass FX 600 50 12 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.20
IRR: Avg. Ass 600 50 12 -0.05 0.04 -0.12 0.11
IRR: 2y Ass 600 50 12 -0.10 0.04 -0.20 0.04
CET1 / TA 600 50 12 7.69 1.58 4.02 12.33
CET1 / RWA 600 50 12 15.66 3.01 8.37 23.72
CET1/RWA - B3 Requirement 600 50 12 8.21 3.04 0.57 16.32
Int Earned on Loans, % of TA 300 50 6 1.56 0.26 0.84 2.38
Int Earned, % of TA 300 50 6 1.65 0.27 0.89 2.47
Int Paid, % of TA 300 50 6 0.51 0.17 0.06 0.98
Net Int Inc, % of TA 300 50 6 1.13 0.18 0.61 1.78
Loan Fees, bps(1/100%) of TA 300 50 6 1.62 2.48 0.03 17.61
All Fees, bps(1/100%) of BusVol 300 50 6 19.70 9.05 0.00 59.24
Net Fee Inc, bps(1/100%) of BusVol 300 50 6 16.52 7.91 -1.57 46.92
Gross Profit, % of BusVol 300 50 6 0.43 0.24 0.00 0.97
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Table 2. Reallocating Liquidity 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned Swiss retail banks over the period July 2013 to June 2016 (36 months). The dependent variable is 
equal to respectively the balance sheet shares of liquid assets (columns 1 and 6), all (exposed and non-exposed) SNB reserves (columns 2 and 
7), interbank loans (columns 3 and 6) and funding (columns 4 and 9), as well as the difference between the latter two (columns 5 and 10). In 
columns (1) to (5) we estimate Model (1), in columns (4) to (6) we add bank and month fixed effects. In columns (11) to (15) we express 
dependent variables in year-on-year growth rates. Post is equal to one from January 2015 and zero otherwise. The continuous treatment 
variable (T) is equal to exposed reserves (ER), i.e. to the difference between total SNB reserves and the regulatory exemption threshold, scaled 
by total assets, in December 2014. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
 
 
Table 3. Funding Choices and the Zero Lower Bound 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned Swiss retail banks over the period July 2013 to June 2016 (36 months). The dependent variable is 
equal to respectively the year-on-year growth rate of total assets (columns 1 and 7), the balance sheet shares of deposit funding (columns 2 
and 8), total bond funding (columns 3 and 9), cash bond funding (columns 4 and 10), CET1 (columns 5 and 11), and the regulatory capital 
cushion, i.e. the distance between CET1/RWA and each bank’s regulatory capital requirement (columns 6 and 12). In columns (1) to (6) we 
estimate Model (1), in columns (7) to (12) we add bank and month fixed effects. In columns (13) to (16) we express dependent variables in 
year-on-year growth rates. Post is equal to one from January 2015 and zero otherwise. The continuous treatment variable (T) is equal to 
exposed reserves (ER), i.e. the difference between total SNB reserves and the exemption threshold, scaled by total assets, in December 2014. 
Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
 
Liquid 
Assets (% 
of TA)
All SNB 
Reserves 
(% of TA)
Claims on 
Banks (% 
of TA)
Interbank 
Funding 
(% of TA)
NIB 
Position 
(% of TA)
Liquid 
Assets (% 
of TA)
All SNB 
Reserves 
(% of TA)
Claims on 
Banks (% 
of TA)
Interbank 
Funding 
(% of TA)
NIB 
Position 
(% of TA)
Liquid 
Assets 
(yoy 
growth)
All SNB 
Reserves 
(yoy 
growth)
Claims on 
Banks 
(yoy 
growth)
Interbank 
Funding 
(yoy 
growth)
NIB 
Position 
(yoy 
growth)
Post*T -0.53*** -0.54*** 0.20* -0.15 0.24*** -0.53*** -0.55*** 0.14*** -0.16*** 0.26*** -5.16*** -0.45 3.68*** 32.45 -7.44
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (1.58) (4.58) (0.88) (88.80) (23.54)
Post 0.06 0.08 0.53 0.08 -0.15
(0.40) (0.40) (0.71) (0.52) (0.47)
T 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.06 0.20 -0.03
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.28) (0.11)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Time FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,764 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,764 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,764 1,764
R2 0.47 0.49 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.56 0.57 0.16 0.13 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
Standard errors clustered by bank. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
 
TA (yoy 
growth)
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Cash 
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
CET1 (% 
of TA)
Reg. 
capital 
cushion
TA (yoy 
growth)
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Cash 
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
CET1 (% 
of TA)
Reg. 
capital 
cushion
Deposit 
Funding 
(yoy 
growth)
Bond 
Funding 
(yoy 
growth)
Cash 
Bond 
Funding 
(yoy 
growth)
CET1 
(yoy 
growth)
Post*T -0.39*** 0.25*** -0.10** 0.03* 0.06*** 0.03 -0.24*** 0.22*** -0.14*** 0.08*** 0.01* -0.07*** 0.12 -0.51** -0.18 -0.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.25) (0.30) (0.08)
Post -1.33** 0.26 0.36 -0.39*** 0.38*** 0.87***
(0.52) (0.55) (0.27) (0.12) (0.11) (0.20)
T 0.03 0.08 -0.47** 0.12 -0.08 -0.09
(0.11) (0.45) (0.19) (0.19) (0.05) (0.09)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Time FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 600 600 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 600 600 1,800 1,729 1,728 600
R2 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.19 0.23 - - 0.02 0.03 0.00 -
Standard errors clustered by bank. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Profitability and Income 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned Swiss retail banks over the period 2013H2 to 2016H1. The dependent variable is equal to 
respectively the difference between interest earned and interest paid, scaled by total assets (columns 1 and 7), interest earned over total assets 
(columns 2 and 8), interest paid over total assets (columns 3 and 9), loan related fees over total assets, expressed in basis points (columns 3 
and 10), net fee income over total business volume (total assets plus assets under management and fiduciary assets (columns 5 and 11), and 
gross profits over total business volume (columns 6 and 12). In columns (1) to (6) we estimate Model (1), in columns (7) to (12) we add bank 
and month fixed effects. In columns (13) to (18) we express dependent variables in year-on-year growth rates. Post is equal to one from 
2015H1 and zero otherwise. The continuous treatment variable (T) is equal to exposed reserves (ER), i.e. the difference between total SNB 
reserves and the exemption threshold, scaled by total assets, in December 2014. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
 
NII (% of 
TA)
Interest 
Earned (% 
of TA)
Interest 
Paid (% of 
TA)
Loan Fees 
(‰ of TA)
Net Fee 
Income 
(‰ of 
Business 
Volume)
Gross 
Profits (% 
of 
Business 
Volume)
NII (% of 
TA)
Interest 
Earned (% 
of TA)
Interest 
Paid (% of 
TA)
Loan Fees 
(‰ of TA)
Net Fee 
Income 
(‰ of 
Business 
Volume)
Gross 
Profits (% 
of 
Business 
Volume)
NII (yoy 
growth)
Interest 
Earned 
(yoy 
growth)
Interest 
Paid (yoy 
growth)
Loan Fees 
(yoy 
growth)
Net Fee 
Income 
(yoy 
growth)
Gross 
Profits 
(yoy 
growth)
Post*T 0.01*** 0.01** 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.01** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.04* 0.17*** 0.02*** -0.07 0.10* 0.68** 2.04* 0.65** 3.93***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.08) (0.05) (0.27) (1.18) (0.31) (0.57)
Post -0.02 -0.16*** -0.14*** 0.13 -0.29 -0.17***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.16) (0.75) (0.02)
T -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.71** -0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.29) (0.00)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Time FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 294 300
R2 0.04 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.13 0.21 0.40 0.60 0.52 0.10 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.12
Standard errors clustered by bank. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. Lending Rates and Funding Costs 
Banks report the rates as offered on their website to the SNB. Actual lending rates may vary from customer to customer with a customer's 
characteristics. The sample covers all "banks whose total Swiss-franc denominated amounts due in respect of customer deposits and cash 
bonds in Switzerland exceed CHF 500 million (excluding private bankers who do not actively seek deposits from the public)". For the original 
form and further details, see https://snb.ch/en/emi/ZISAX. Unfortunately not all banks report rates for all products in all periods, thus we focus 
on the products for which rates are reported most frequently and hence are most representative. Columns (1) to (4) show lending rates for 
variable rate mortgages (column 1), and for fixed term mortgages with maturities between 5 and 15 years. Columns (5) to (9) show borrowing 
rates for demand, sight and time deposits, and for cash bonds at 2- and 8-year maturity. Post is equal to one from January 2015 and zero 
otherwise. The continuous treatment variable (T) is equal to exposed reserves (ER), i.e. the difference between total SNB reserves and the 
exemption threshold, scaled by total assets, in December 2014. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
    
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A
Mortg. 
Libor C3 
F3
Mortg. 5 
yrs
Mortg. 10 
yrs
Mortg. 15 
yrs
Demand 
Deposits
Sight 
Deposits
Time Dep. 
3m
Cash 
Bonds 2y
Cash 
Bonds 8y
Post*T -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.05* 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Post -0.16 -0.35*** -0.55*** -0.15 0.10 -0.24*** -0.28 -0.04 -0.55***
(0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.08) (0.07) (0.35) (0.06) (0.07)
T 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Time FE No No No No No No No No No
Bank FE No No No No No No No No No
Obs. 512 1,280 1,190 171 1,360 1,360 982 1,062 1,253
R2 0.06 0.42 0.50 0.44 0.10 0.36 0.12 0.11 0.73
Panel B
Mortg. 
Libor C3 
F3
Mortg. 5 
yrs
Mortg. 10 
yrs
Mortg. 15 
yrs
Demand 
Deposits
Sight 
Deposits
Time Dep. 
3m
Cash 
Bonds 2y
Cash 
Bonds 8y
Post*T 0.00 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.06*** -0.01** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 512 1,280 1,190 171 1,360 1,360 982 1,062 1,253
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Interest Rates and Swap Use 
Banks report to FINMA whether or not they use interest rate swaps to hedge their interest rate risk. We investigate how our baseline treatment 
interacts with interest rate swap use in affecting mortgage rates. Rates themselves are reported to FINMA and SNB, but not all banks report 
all rates as in Table 5. We focus on the products for which rates are reported most frequently and where results are most representative. 
Columns (1) and (2) show lending rates for fixed term mortgages with maturities of 5 and 10 years. Columns (3) to (6) show borrowing rates 
for demand, sight and time deposits, and for cash bonds at 8-year maturity. Post is a dummy variable equal to one if a bank reports Swap use 
in December 2014, and zero otherwise (results are robust to conditioning on Swap use in September 2014). Post is equal to one from January 
2015 and zero otherwise. The continuous treatment variable (T) is equal to exposed reserves (ER), i.e. the difference between total SNB 
reserves and the exemption threshold, scaled by total assets, in December 2014. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
  
 
Table 7. Lending and Investing 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned Swiss retail banks over the period July 2013 to June 2016 (36 months). The dependent variable is 
equal to the balance sheet shares of uncollateralized loans (columns 1 and 4), mortgage loans (columns 2 and 5), and the book value of a 
bank’s financial assets (columns 3 and 6). In columns (1) to (3) we estimate Model (1), in columns (4) to (6) we add bank and month fixed 
effects. In columns (7) to (9) we express dependent variables in year-on-year growth rates. Post is equal to one from January 2015 and zero 
otherwise. The continuous treatment variable (ER) is equal to exposed reserves, i.e. the difference between total SNB reserves and the 
exemption threshold, scaled by total assets, in December 2014. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
Mortgages 
5 yrs
Mortgages 
10 yrs
Demand 
Deposits
Sight 
Deposits
Time Dep. 
3m
Cash 
Bonds 8y
Post*T*Swap -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.00 -0.05*** -0.01 -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Post*T 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.00 0.05*** 0.01 0.07***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Post*Swap -0.36*** -0.55*** 0.11 -0.24*** -0.27 -0.56***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07) (0.32) (0.07)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,280 1,190 1,360 1,360 982 1,062
R2 0.48 0.53 0.16 0.49 0.18 0.26
Standard errors clustered by bank. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
 
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Financial 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Financial 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Loan 
Assets 
(yoy 
growth)
Mortgage 
Assets 
(yoy 
growth)
Financial 
Assets 
(yoy 
growth)
Post*T 0.09*** 0.13** 0.03 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.06*** 1.01 0.07 0.07
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.64) (0.05) (0.42)
Post -0.42* -0.28 -0.34**
(0.23) (0.34) (0.15)
T -0.23 -0.88** 0.01
(0.14) (0.40) (0.15)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Time FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800
R2 0.05 0.13 0.01 0.29 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.00
Standard errors clustered by bank. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
50 
Table 8. Risk-Taking 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned Swiss retail banks over the period 2013Q3 to 2016Q2 (12 quarterly risk reports). The dependent 
variable is equal to respectively the balance sheet share and growth rate of risk-weighted assets (column 1 and 2), the shares of banks’ capital 
requirement due to respectively Credit Risk (column 3), Market Risk (column 4) and Operational Risk (column 5). In columns (6) to (9) the 
dependent variables capture banks' interest rate risk, quantified by the losses incurred in case of a 100bp increase in market rates in % of bank 
equity. This risk measure is routinely calculated by FINMA based on how banks’ assets and liabilities are distributed across different maturity 
brackets. For assets and liabilities with unspecified maturities, such as sight deposits, columns (6) and (7) use each bank’s own assumption, 
for positions in CHF (column 6) and foreign currency (column 7), respectively. Column (8) uses the average assumption across banks within 
each quarter, and column (9) uses a bank- and time-invariant assumption of 2 years. In Panel A we estimate Model (1), in Panel B we add 
bank and month fixed effects. Post is equal to one from 2015Q1 and zero otherwise, the continuous treatment variable (ER) is given by 
exposed reserves, i.e. the difference between total SNB reserves and the exemption threshold, scaled by total assets, in December 2014. 
Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A
RWA (% 
of TA)
RWA (yoy 
growth)
CapReq 
Share, 
Credit 
Risk
CapReq 
Share, 
Market 
Risk
CapReq 
Share, Op. 
Risk
IRR: CHF, 
Bank Ass.
IRR: FX, 
Bank Ass
IRR: CHF, 
Avg. Ass.
IRR: CHF, 
2y Ass.
Post*T 0.23 -0.04 -0.32 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04
(0.22) (0.23) (0.48) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Post -1.16 -0.39 -2.93 -0.29 -0.43 -0.92** 0.63 -0.40 -1.91***
(1.73) (1.68) (3.64) (0.30) (0.28) (0.42) (0.38) (0.51) (0.44)
T 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.25* 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.17 0.13
(0.28) (0.19) (0.28) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) (0.09) (0.16) (0.17)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Time FE No No No No No No No No No
Bank FE No No No No No No No No No
R2 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05
Panel B
RWA (% 
of TA)
RWA (yoy 
growth)
CapReq 
Share, 
Credit 
Risk
CapReq 
Share, 
Market 
Risk
CapReq 
Share, Op. 
Risk
IRR: CHF, 
Bank Ass.
IRR: FX, 
Bank Ass
IRR: CHF, 
Avg. Ass.
IRR: CHF, 
2y Ass.
Post*T 0.35*** 0.01 -0.03 0.02*** 0.03* 0.10*** -0.09** -0.02 0.18***
(0.11) (0.09) (0.22) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600
Standard errors clustered by bank. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9. Interest Rate Cut in Positive Territory (August 2011) 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned Swiss retail banks over the period of February 2010 to January 2013 (Panel A) and July 2013 to 
June 2016 (Panel B). Throughout, we estimate Model (1) saturated with bank and time fixed effects. Post is equal to one from August 2011, 
or from January 2015, and zero otherwise. The continuous treatment variable (ExcessR + NIB) is equal to the sum of banks’ NIB position and 
excess reserves, i.e. the difference between total SNB reserves and the minimum reserve requirement, scaled by total assets, in July 2011 
(Panel A), or the sum of exposed reserves and banks’ NIB position in December 2014 (Panel B). Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Panel A
TA (yoy 
growth)
Liquid 
Assets (% 
of TA)
All SNB 
Reserves 
(% of TA)
NIB 
Position 
(% of TA)
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Financial 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
CET1 (% 
of TA)
NII (% of 
TA)
Net Fee 
Income 
(‰ of 
Business 
Volume)
RWA (% 
of TA)
Reg. 
capital 
cushion
Post*T 0.39 0.22*** 0.22** 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.21** -0.04 -0.01 -0.00*** -0.07** 36.76** -0.04
(0.33) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (16.22) (0.04)
T ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    ExcessR    
Period Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011 Aug 2011
Obs. 1,250 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 600 1,800 1,800 600 600
R2 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Panel B
TA (yoy 
growth)
Liquid 
Assets (% 
of TA)
All SNB 
Reserves 
(% of TA)
NIB 
Position 
(% of TA)
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Financial 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
CET1 (% 
of TA)
NII (% of 
TA)
Net Fee 
Income 
(‰ of 
Business 
Volume)
RWA (% 
of TA)
Reg. 
capital 
cushion
Post*T -0.24*** -0.44*** -0.45*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.06*** 0.23*** -0.12*** 0.01** 0.00*** 0.03*** 29.60*** -0.05***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (9.80) (0.01)
T ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB ER + NIB
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015 Jan 2015
Obs. 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 600 1,800 1,800 600 600
R2 0.08 0.50 0.51 0.17 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10. Wealth Management Banks 
The sample covers 46 wealth management (WM) banks over the period July 2013 to June 2016 (36 months), for which summary statistics are 
provided in Table A2 of the Online Appendix. Throughout, we estimate Model (2) and include bank and time fixed effects. The continuous 
treatment variables is equal to exposed reserves (ER), i.e. the difference between total SNB reserves and the exemption threshold, for which 
the pooled sample average is 19.55% among WM banks. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A
Liquid 
Assets (% 
of TA)
All SNB 
Reserves 
(% of TA)
Claims on 
Banks (% 
of TA)
Interbank 
Funding 
(% of TA)
NIB 
Position 
(% of TA)
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Financial 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Post*T -0.32*** -0.37*** -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.05** -0.00 0.09 -0.20** 0.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.08) (0.00)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Obs. 1,656 1,656 1,596 1,564 1,656 1,656 1,656 1,656 1,656 1,656
R2 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00
Panel B
NII (% of 
TA)
Net Fee 
Income 
(‰ of 
Business 
Volume)
Gross 
Profits (% 
of 
Business 
Volume)
IRR: CHF, 
Avg. Ass.
RWA (% 
of TA)
CapReq 
Share, 
Credit 
Risk
CapReq 
Share, 
Market 
Risk
CapReq 
Share, Op. 
Risk
IRR: CHF, 
Bank Ass.
IRR: FX, 
Bank Ass
Post*T -0.00 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.00** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00**
(0.00) (1.52) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 265 265 265 537 512 512 512 512 537 537
R2 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.08
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Online Appendix 
Figure A1. Exchange Rates 
 
Notes: The Figure illustrates the evolution of the exchange rates between the Swiss Franc (CHF) and the Euro (EUR) (CHF Exchange Rate 
(1 EUR)) and between CHF and the US dollar (USD) (CHF Exchange Rate (1 USD)) between July 2013 and June 2016. The vertical line 
identifies the beginning of the treatment period (01/2015). Source: www.snb.ch 
 
 
 
Figure A2. Swap Rates 
 
Notes: The Figure illustrates the evolution of daily swap rates between June 01, 2013 and July 31, 2016. The vertical line identifies the 
beginning of the treatment period (January 01, 2015). Source: Bloomberg  
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Table A1. Summary Statistics by Binary Treatment Group and Treatment Period 
  
Obs Banks Periods Mean sd Min Max Obs Banks Periods Mean SD Min Max Post-Pre Pval
Exposed SNB Reserves/TA 25 25 1 -8.64 1.83 -12.94 -6.34  
(Exposed SNB Res + Net IB Pos) / TA 25 25 1 -9.03 4.74 -23.41 -1.06  
Deposits / TA 25 25 1 44.91 8.29 28.91 61.72  
2015 LCR Req. - Neg. Rate Exemption 25 24 1 -0.07 0.03 -0.15 -0.01  
All SNB Reserves: % of TA 450 25 18 4.06 1.90 0.05 10.79 450 25 18 9.14 3.12 0.75 16.32 5.09 0.00
Liquid Assets: % of TA 450 25 18 4.74 1.86 0.38 11.24 450 25 18 9.67 3.06 1.62 17.12 4.93 0.00
Claims on Banks: % of TA 450 25 18 3.19 2.22 0.15 9.62 450 25 18 2.23 1.60 0.09 13.96 -0.96 0.00
Net Interbank Pos: % of TA 450 25 18 -0.35 4.41 -13.53 8.64 450 25 18 -2.75 4.80 -16.92 10.07 -2.39 0.00
Loan Assets: % of TA 450 25 18 10.28 4.32 2.75 22.29 450 25 18 8.95 3.65 2.58 18.40 -1.33 0.00
Mortgage Assets: % of TA 450 25 18 74.81 7.37 53.24 88.69 450 25 18 72.89 8.03 47.76 87.70 -1.92 0.00
Fin. Assets: % of TA 450 25 18 5.05 1.89 1.34 11.72 450 25 18 4.51 2.08 0.56 11.46 -0.54 0.00
Deposit Funding: % of TA 450 25 18 67.20 5.15 56.84 83.21 450 25 18 64.75 6.28 51.46 85.84 -2.45 0.00
Bond Funding: % of TA 450 25 18 14.22 4.75 0.00 21.63 450 25 18 15.67 5.03 0.00 25.58 1.45 0.00
Dues to Banks: % of TA 450 25 18 3.55 3.98 0.00 13.76 450 25 18 5.14 5.32 0.00 24.37 1.59 0.00
Cash Bond Funding: % of TA 450 25 18 3.51 3.18 0.07 12.64 450 25 18 2.89 2.89 0.03 11.72 -0.62 0.00
FX Share Total Assets 450 25 18 3.05 3.28 0.10 16.82 450 25 18 2.32 2.81 0.07 16.66 -0.73 0.00
FX Share Total Liabilities 450 25 18 4.03 3.36 0.03 16.78 450 25 18 4.44 4.61 0.04 24.45 0.40 0.13
RWA Density 150 25 6 0.47 0.12 0.06 0.97 150 25 6 0.45 0.14 0.02 0.96 -0.03 0.10
Credit Risk Share of Req. Equity 150 25 6 0.96 0.20 0.86 1.88 150 25 6 0.97 0.21 0.86 1.89 0.01 0.73
Market Risk Share of Req. Equity 150 25 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 150 25 6 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.15
OpRisk Share of Req. Equity 150 25 6 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.14 150 25 6 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.28
IRR: Bank Ass CHF 150 25 6 -0.05 0.04 -0.16 0.08 150 25 6 -0.06 0.05 -0.19 0.05 -0.01 0.16
IRR: Bank Ass FX 150 25 6 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.17 150 25 6 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.11
IRR: Avg. Ass 150 25 6 -0.05 0.03 -0.10 0.05 150 25 6 -0.04 0.04 -0.10 0.06 0.00 0.27
IRR: 2y Ass 150 25 6 -0.09 0.03 -0.16 0.01 150 25 6 -0.10 0.04 -0.16 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
CET1 / TA 150 25 6 8.01 1.87 4.60 12.33 150 25 6 7.87 1.78 4.68 12.29 -0.14 0.50
CET1 / RWA 150 25 6 15.77 3.38 9.28 23.72 150 25 6 16.36 3.14 10.07 23.29 0.59 0.12
CET1/RWA - B3 Requirement 150 25 6 8.31 3.39 2.28 16.32 150 25 6 8.89 3.15 3.07 16.00 0.59 0.12
Int Earned on Loans, % of TA 75 25 3 1.70 0.19 1.37 2.05 75 25 3 1.46 0.22 1.03 1.93 -0.24 0.00
Int Earned, % of TA 75 25 3 1.79 0.20 1.44 2.20 75 25 3 1.53 0.24 1.04 2.13 -0.26 0.00
Int Paid, % of TA 75 25 3 0.61 0.15 0.33 0.98 75 25 3 0.43 0.16 0.06 0.75 -0.18 0.00
Net Int Inc, % of TA 75 25 3 1.19 0.17 0.90 1.62 75 25 3 1.10 0.16 0.89 1.56 -0.08 0.00
Loan Fees, bps(1/100%) of TA 75 25 3 1.79 3.16 0.15 17.61 75 25 3 1.41 2.28 0.04 13.13 -0.38 0.41
All Fees, bps(1/100%) of BusVol 75 25 3 21.59 8.86 9.01 49.94 75 25 3 19.56 7.90 8.07 41.97 -2.02 0.14
Net Fee Inc, bps(1/100%) of BusVol 75 25 3 19.26 8.81 6.02 46.92 75 25 3 17.48 7.85 6.19 39.83 -1.78 0.19
Gross Profit, % of BusVol 75 25 3 0.58 0.15 0.28 0.93 75 25 3 0.36 0.27 0.00 0.83 -0.22 0.00
Obs Banks Periods Mean sd Min Max Obs Banks Periods Mean SD Min Max Post-Pre Pval
Exposed SNB Reserves/TA 25 25 1 -2.88 4.14 -6.26 8.75  
(Exposed SNB Res + Net IB Pos) / TA 25 25 1 -2.80 5.29 -12.89 13.67  
Deposits / TA 25 25 1 50.29 12.38 24.94 69.61  
2015 LCR Req. - Neg. Rate Exemption 25 25 1 -0.06 0.03 -0.12 0.00  
All SNB Reserves: % of TA 450 25 18 8.30 4.76 0.04 27.51 450 25 18 9.59 3.79 2.27 22.06 1.29 0.00
Liquid Assets: % of TA 450 25 18 8.86 4.70 0.12 28.06 450 25 18 10.11 3.71 2.33 22.50 1.25 0.00
Claims on Banks: % of TA 450 25 18 3.29 2.66 0.30 11.52 450 25 18 3.06 2.84 0.13 14.48 -0.23 0.21
Net Interbank Pos: % of TA 450 25 18 0.16 3.74 -9.44 10.03 450 25 18 -0.51 3.94 -11.86 6.73 -0.67 0.01
Loan Assets: % of TA 450 25 18 7.65 4.11 1.58 20.70 450 25 18 7.09 4.08 2.14 19.66 -0.56 0.04
Mortgage Assets: % of TA 450 25 18 71.80 11.19 36.52 86.31 450 25 18 71.63 11.32 32.39 85.90 -0.17 0.82
Fin. Assets: % of TA 450 25 18 4.84 3.41 1.05 18.42 450 25 18 4.41 3.11 0.63 16.88 -0.43 0.05
Deposit Funding: % of TA 450 25 18 69.13 8.29 43.76 92.31 450 25 18 69.27 9.04 39.11 95.99 0.14 0.81
Bond Funding: % of TA 450 25 18 10.94 5.48 0.00 21.19 450 25 18 11.31 5.58 0.00 22.85 0.37 0.31
Dues to Banks: % of TA 432 24 18 3.32 5.10 0.00 20.42 432 24 18 3.65 5.47 0.00 22.78 0.32 0.37
Cash Bond Funding: % of TA 450 25 18 4.49 4.68 0.00 15.94 450 25 18 3.96 4.37 0.00 16.00 -0.54 0.08
FX Share Total Assets 450 25 18 2.94 3.79 0.01 17.57 450 25 18 2.61 3.34 0.03 17.01 -0.33 0.17
FX Share Total Liabilities 450 25 18 4.44 6.15 0.00 24.42 450 25 18 4.60 6.52 0.00 27.75 0.17 0.69
RWA Density 150 25 6 0.47 0.12 0.34 1.05 150 25 6 0.45 0.09 0.37 1.13 -0.02 0.05
Credit Risk Share of Req. Equity 150 25 6 0.94 0.22 0.71 1.85 150 25 6 0.91 0.20 0.65 2.56 -0.03 0.22
Market Risk Share of Req. Equity 150 25 6 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.23 150 25 6 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.44
OpRisk Share of Req. Equity 150 25 6 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.20 150 25 6 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.08
IRR: Bank Ass CHF 150 25 6 -0.05 0.04 -0.14 0.05 150 25 6 -0.06 0.04 -0.15 0.04 -0.01 0.02
IRR: Bank Ass FX 150 25 6 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.15 150 25 6 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.04
IRR: Avg. Ass 150 25 6 -0.05 0.04 -0.12 0.10 150 25 6 -0.05 0.05 -0.11 0.11 0.00 0.34
IRR: 2y Ass 150 25 6 -0.10 0.05 -0.18 0.04 150 25 6 -0.12 0.05 -0.20 0.03 -0.02 0.00
CET1 / TA 150 25 6 7.32 1.22 4.02 9.27 150 25 6 7.56 1.28 4.53 11.67 0.24 0.09
CET1 / RWA 150 25 6 14.85 2.52 8.37 19.20 150 25 6 15.64 2.75 9.35 21.20 0.79 0.01
CET1/RWA - B3 Requirement 150 25 6 7.43 2.58 0.57 12.11 150 25 6 8.22 2.80 1.95 14.20 0.79 0.01
Int Earned on Loans, % of TA 75 25 3 1.63 0.27 0.86 2.25 75 25 3 1.47 0.28 0.84 2.38 -0.16 0.00
Int Earned, % of TA 75 25 3 1.73 0.27 0.97 2.31 75 25 3 1.54 0.28 0.89 2.47 -0.19 0.00
Int Paid, % of TA 75 25 3 0.58 0.15 0.29 0.86 75 25 3 0.43 0.15 0.06 0.76 -0.15 0.00
Net Int Inc, % of TA 75 25 3 1.15 0.18 0.68 1.56 75 25 3 1.10 0.19 0.61 1.78 -0.04 0.15
Loan Fees, bps(1/100%) of TA 75 25 3 1.64 2.25 0.03 11.73 75 25 3 1.63 2.12 0.03 10.87 -0.01 0.98
All Fees, bps(1/100%) of BusVol 75 25 3 19.31 10.39 6.16 59.24 75 25 3 18.32 8.75 0.00 45.67 -0.99 0.53
Net Fee Inc, bps(1/100%) of BusVol 75 25 3 14.87 7.20 0.00 34.14 75 25 3 14.46 6.80 -1.57 27.98 -0.40 0.72
Gross Profit, % of BusVol 75 25 3 0.48 0.16 0.16 0.97 75 25 3 0.31 0.25 0.00 0.83 -0.18 0.00
Panel B: ER >= Median
Panel A: ER < Median
July 2013 - December 2014 January 2015 - June 2016 Diff
July 2013 - December 2014 January 2015 - June 2016 Diff
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Table A2. Pooled Summary Statistics (Wealth Management Banks) 
   
Notes: The Table shows summary statistics for our pooled sample of 46 domestically owned wealth management (WM) banks, covered over 
respectively 36 months (balance sheet positions), 6 semesters (income) and 12 quarters (capitalization and risk-taking measures). WM banks 
are defined as those earning 55% or more of their income in fees. For more details on the sample construction, see Section 3.2.   
 
Obs Mean SD Min Max
Exposed SNB Reserves/TA 46 19.55 17.45 -11.24 69.10
Liquid Assets: % of TA 1,656 33.43 21.82 0.00 85.39
All SNB Reserves: % of TA 1,656 31.29 21.91 0.00 85.36
Claims on Banks: % of TA 1,596 27.81 17.99 1.59 87.26
Net Interbank Pos: % of TA 1,656 18.48 20.51 -36.56 87.18
Loan Assets: % of TA 1,656 13.35 10.88 0.00 67.92
Mortgage Assets: % of TA 1,656 3.25 8.07 0.00 46.39
Fin. Assets: % of TA 1,656 11.15 13.08 0.00 85.36
Deposit Funding: % of TA 1,656 74.58 19.91 0.00 133.04
Bond Funding: % of TA 1,656 0.99 4.01 0.00 30.17
Dues to Banks: % of TA 1,564 7.57 9.79 0.00 97.64
FX Share, Total Assets 1,596 42.60 21.76 1.11 87.27
FX Share, Total Liabilities 1,596 52.08 23.03 1.10 88.50
NII /TA, bps 265 0.39 0.32 -0.48 2.06
Net Fee Inc / BusVol, bps 265 56.81 143.94 -64.56 2313.46
Gross Profit, % of BusVol 265 0.18 0.35 -1.43 4.40
IRR: Avg. Ass 537 0.03 0.05 -0.10 0.36
IRR: 2y Ass 537 -0.02 0.03 -0.14 0.11
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Table A3. Profitability and Market Power 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned Swiss retail banks over the period 2013H2 to 2016H1. The dependent variable is equal to 
respectively the difference between interest earned and interest paid, scaled by total assets (columns 1 and 7), interest earned over total assets 
(columns 2 and 8), interest paid over total assets (columns 3 and 9), loan related fees over total assets, expressed in basis points (columns 3 
and 10), net fee income over total business volume (total assets plus assets under management and fiduciary assets (columns 5 and 11), and 
gross profits over total business volume (columns 6 and 12). In columns (1) to (6) we estimate Model (1), but add interactions with HHI, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann index for concentration in the mortgage market (see below). Note that we had to compute market shares based on the 
levels of mortgages on the balance sheets of each bank in each canton, as we do not have the corresponding numbers for new lending. In 
columns (7) to (12) we add bank and time FEs. Post is equal to one from 2015H1 and zero otherwise. The continuous treatment variable (T) 
is equal to exposed reserves (ER), i.e. the difference between total SNB reserves and the regulatory exemption threshold, scaled by total assets, 
in December 2014. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index (HHI). To construct a measure of banks' market power in the mortgage market, we exploit the fact that the 
26 Swiss cantons/ states can be considered as separate markets. Many cantonal as well as regional and savings banks operate only in specific 
cantons, leading to different numbers of competitors in each canton. We use annual data on mortgages on bank balance sheets by bank and 
canton to compute for each canton the market share of each bank. Then we calculate the HHI as the sum of squared market shares.44 
Hypothetically, this measure would reach a value of unity in the case of a perfect monopoly and approach zero under perfect competition. In 
our data based on 2014 balance sheets, the minimum value across all 26 cantons is 0.12 in Berne and the maximum value obtained for 
Appenzell Innerrhoden is as high as 0.49. We then map these 26 HHI values to banks by assigning to each bank the weighted average over 
these 26 values, using as weights the distribution of the bank's existing mortgage volume across the 26 cantons.45 Then we interact our baseline 
negative rate treatment measure with the bank-specific measure of concentration of the average mortgage market the bank operates in.   
                                                             
44 Note that for data reasons we compute this only based on the distribution of mortgage volumes already on banks' balance sheets, as opposed 
to the distribution of new lending, and therefore obtain a measure that is slightly backward-looking, reflecting new lending accumulated over 
the past few years. The resulting table of market concentration by canton is available on request. 
45 Notice that our original sample includes all banks chartered in Switzerland, so that we are in a position to calculate market shares for the 
entire market, not just for the subsample of retail banks that we focus on in our analysis. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 
NII (% of 
TA)
Interest 
Earned (% 
of TA)
Interest 
Paid (% of 
TA)
Loan Fees 
(‰ of TA)
Net Fee 
Income 
(‰ of 
Business 
Volume)
Gross 
Profits (% 
of 
Business 
Volume)
NII (% of 
TA)
Interest 
Earned (% 
of TA)
Interest 
Paid (% of 
TA)
Loan Fees 
(‰ of TA)
Net Fee 
Income 
(‰ of 
Business 
Volume)
Gross 
Profits (% 
of 
Business 
Volume)
Post*T -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.26 -0.02 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00 -0.05*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.47) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Post -0.23** -0.43*** -0.20* 0.45 0.23 -0.35**
(0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.75) (3.32) (0.14)
T 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.22 -0.04
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.40) (1.79) (0.04)
Post*T*HHI 0.16* 0.22* 0.06 -0.14 2.01 0.13 -0.00 -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.03 0.36*** -0.02***
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.68) (2.81) (0.11) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.13) (0.01)
Post*HHI 1.16** 1.47* 0.31 -1.78 -2.99 0.99 -0.02 -0.14*** -0.12*** 0.11 -0.29 -0.15***
(0.57) (0.85) (0.59) (4.71) (20.07) (0.73) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.15) (0.69) (0.02)
T*HHI -0.07 0.01 0.08 0.14 -2.42 0.13
(0.30) (0.42) (0.24) (2.58) (9.76) (0.22)
HHI -1.21 -0.42 0.80 1.26 4.66 0.60
(2.02) (2.88) (1.65) (18.00) (65.02) (1.39)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Time FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 300 300 300 300 300 300 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800
R2 0.09 0.20 0.25 0.00 0.14 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Standard errors clustered by bank. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A4. Wealth Management vs. Retail Banks 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned retail and 46 domestically owned wealth management banks over the period July 2013 to June 
2016 (36 months). The dependent variable in columns (1) to (12) is equal to the balance sheet shares of SNB reserves, the net interbank 
position, uncollateralized loans, mortgages, deposit funding, bond funding, the ratio of net interest income over total assets, net fee income 
over business volume (total assets plus assets under management), gross profits over business volume, risk-weighted assets over total assets, 
non-CHF assets over total assets, and non-CHF liabilities over total liabilities Rather than with Exposed Reserves, we interact the Post dummy 
with a dummy for the 46 Wealth Management banks, whose average treatment value was 20.6% of total assets, compared to -3.81% for retail 
banks. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
 
 
Table A5. Interaction with Banks’ Capital Cushions 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned Swiss retail banks over the period July 2013 to June 2016 (36 months). The dependent variable is 
equal to respectively the ratio of uncollateralized loans to total assets (columns 1 and 6), the ratio of mortgage loans to total assets (columns 
2 and 7), the book value of a bank’s financial assets, scaled by total assets (columns 3 and 8), as well as the ratios of deposit (columns 4 and 
9) and bond funding (columns 5 and 10) over total assets. We estimate Model (1) interacted with the regulatory capital cushion in columns 
(1) to (5), and add bank and time fixed effects in columns (6) to (10). RegCapCushion is equal to the bank's actual risk-weighted capital ratio 
minus the supervisor's intervention threshold for the same measure in December 2014. Post is equal to one from January 2015 and zero 
otherwise. The continuous treatment variable is equal to exposed reserves (ER), i.e. the difference between total SNB reserves and the 
exemption threshold, scaled by total assets, in December 2014. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 
All SNB 
Reserves 
(% of TA)
NIB 
Position 
(% of TA)
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
NII (% of 
TA)
Net Fee 
Income 
(‰ of 
Business 
Volume)
Gross 
Profits (% 
of 
Business 
Volume)
RWA (% 
of TA)
Total 
Assets 
(FX 
Share)
Total 
Liabilities 
(FX 
Share)
Post*T -7.34*** -2.73 1.72** -0.18 -4.09* 0.25 -0.01 23.04 -0.06 0.02** 2.01* 3.75***
(1.74) (1.65) (0.65) (0.44) (2.17) (0.18) (0.02) (21.08) (0.04) (0.01) (1.08) (0.79)
T WM WM WM WM WM WM WM WM WM WM WM WM
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3,456 3,456 3,456 3,456 3,456 3,456 565 565 565 1,112 3,396 3,396
R2 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.15
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
 
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Financial 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Financial 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Post*T*RegCapCushion -0.53 -9.32 3.78 -1.52 -1.56 -1.53* 7.20 3.28* 7.93* 5.37**
(1.42) (6.12) (2.67) (5.70) (5.47) (0.81) (5.28) (1.91) (4.27) (2.55)
Post*RegCapCushion -1.01 -90.67 7.29 -51.46 -22.60 -10.22** 61.64* 2.70 35.71* 23.43**
(14.53) (55.16) (13.29) (44.28) (24.38) (5.07) (35.21) (4.56) (20.27) (11.25)
T*RegCapCushion -4.46 -135.30 -0.73 -106.74 -37.16
(24.58) (137.98) (10.56) (153.19) (44.03)
RegCapCushion -111.05 -1,214.22 1.88 -1,065.65 -343.25
(192.29) (1,167.31) (82.57) (1,292.49) (322.52)
Post*T 1.00 80.01 -28.29 9.14 6.70 8.82 -49.33 -24.39** -64.88** -56.56**
(11.06) (70.11) (17.31) (46.89) (51.28) (5.44) (30.29) (11.83) (27.12) (24.57)
Post -74.90 1,239.37** -37.34 709.26* 403.41*
(111.67) (596.06) (89.82) (399.35) (213.74)
T 146.08 1,591.05 33.38 1,586.50 479.68
(270.57) (1,546.80) (94.27) (1,742.38) (498.85)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Time FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,746 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,746
R2 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.25 0.09 0.09 0.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A6. Foreign Currency Exposure 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned Swiss retail banks over the period July 2013 to June 2016 (36 months). The dependent variable is 
equal respectively to the ratio of non-CHF liquid assets to total liquid assets (columns 1 and 5), the ratio of total non-CHF assets to total assets 
(columns 2 and 6), the ratio of non-CHF deposits to total deposits (columns 3 and 7), and the ratio of non-CHF liabilities to total liabilities 
(columns 4 and 8). In columns (1) to (4) we estimate Model (1), in columns (5) to (8) we add bank and month fixed effects. Post is equal to 
one from January 2015 and zero otherwise. The continuous treatment variable (T) is equal to exposed reserves (ER), i.e. the difference between 
total SNB reserves and the regulatory exemption threshold, scaled by total assets, in December 2014. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 
Liq Assets
Total 
Assets
Deposits
Total 
Liabilities
Liq Assets
Total 
Assets
Deposits
Total 
Liabilities
Post*T 1.38*** 0.09** 0.12 0.03 0.50*** 0.08*** 0.02 -0.04
(0.51) (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.16) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Post -6.80*** -0.39*** -0.18* 0.01
(1.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.18)
T -1.81*** -0.75*** -0.31** -0.91***
(0.52) (0.28) (0.12) (0.31)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Time FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,400 1,800
R2 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.03
Percentage share of the respective position held in foreign currency. Standard errors clustered by bank. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A7. Liquidity Regulation under Basel III 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned Swiss retail banks over the period July 2013 to June 2016 (36 months). In Panel A, the dependent 
variable is equal to the balance sheet shares of liquid assets (columns 1 and 6), SNB reserves (columns 2 and 7), claims on other banks 
(columns 3 and 8), the difference between a bank’s interbank lending and borrowing (columns 4 and 9), and banks’ Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(column 5). In Panel B, the dependent variable is equal to respectively year-on-year growth in total assets (column 1), the ratio of 
uncollateralized loans to total assets (columns 2 and 7), the ratio of mortgage loans to total assets (columns 3 and 8), and the book value of a 
bank’s financial assets, scaled by total assets (columns 4 and 9). In Panel C, the dependent variable is equal to the balance sheet share of 
deposit funding (columns 1 and 6), bond funding (columns 2 and 7), interbank funding (columns 3 and 8), cash bond funding (columns 4 and 
9), and CET1 (columns 5 and 10). Throughout, we estimate Model (1) in columns (1) to (5), and add bank and month fixed effects in columns 
(6) to (10). Post is equal to one from January 2015 and zero otherwise. The continuous treatment variable (T) is equal to the difference between 
total liquid assets required of each bank in 2015 and the negative interest rate exemption over total assets (LCR Dist.). 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A
Liquid 
Assets (% 
of TA)
All SNB 
Reserves 
(% of TA)
Claims on 
Banks (% 
of TA)
NIB 
Position 
(% of TA)
LCR
Liquid 
Assets (% 
of TA)
All SNB 
Reserves 
(% of TA)
Claims on 
Banks (% 
of TA)
NIB 
Position 
(% of TA)
 
Post*T 5.41 2.88 -11.78 2.56 -8.00* -39.58*** -41.25*** 6.08 19.62***  
(18.70) (19.04) (11.16) (10.24) (4.73) (8.27) (8.37) (4.55) (4.65)  
Post 3.32*** 3.26*** -1.32** -1.26* -0.25
(1.09) (1.10) (0.63) (0.73) (0.22)
T 5.40 11.74 6.72 -32.08** -5.90
(29.77) (30.18) (15.92) (15.53) (4.69)
T LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist.  
Obs. 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,078 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764  
R2 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.28 0.30 0.03 0.14
Panel B
TA (yoy 
growth)
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Financial 
Assets (% 
of TA)
  
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Financial 
Assets (% 
of TA)
 
Post*T 6.01 7.47 -12.41 3.28  13.74*** 11.41** 6.83***
(20.77) (5.24) (12.88) (3.82)  (1.99) (5.54) (1.90)
Post 1.12 -0.46 -1.76** -0.26
(1.30) (0.36) (0.74) (0.24)
T -13.02 -1.21 -74.75 24.16*
(11.40) (25.42) (61.75) (13.84)
T LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist.   LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist.  
Obs. 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764  1,764 1,764 1,764
R2 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07  0.26 0.06 0.12
Panel C
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Interbank 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Cash 
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
CET1 (% 
of TA)
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Interbank 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Cash 
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
CET1 (% 
of TA)
Post*T -7.11 1.42 -2.51 6.43 -0.11 13.10* -12.23*** -12.25*** 9.02*** -0.92
(15.42) (8.43) (10.38) (4.63) (2.38) (6.87) (3.28) (4.30) (1.77) (1.02)
Post -1.49 1.01* 0.71 -0.19 0.06
(0.93) (0.58) (0.70) (0.26) (0.17)
T -104.51*** 46.84 53.69* -20.49 7.82
(36.07) (31.88) (27.43) (19.41) (8.03)
T LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist. LCR Dist.
Time FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,764 1,764 1,728 1,764 588 1,764 1,764 1,728 1,764 588
R2 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.28  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
60 
Table A8. The Role of Banks’ Initial Deposit Rates 
The sample covers 50 domestically owned Swiss retail banks over the period July 2013 to June 2016 (36 months). The dependent variable is 
equal to respectively the ratio SNB reserves to total assets (column 1), the net interbank position over total assets (column 2), uncollateralized 
loans over total assets (column 3), mortgage loans over total assets (column 4), the book value of a bank’s financial assets, scaled by total 
assets (column 5), deposit funding over total assets (column 6), bond funding over total assets (column 7), cash bond funding over total assets 
(column 8), CET1 capital over total assets (column 9), the bank-level reference rates banks pay on demand (column 10) and sight deposits 
(column 11). Throughout, we estimate Model (2) and include bank and time fixed effects. The continuous treatment variables are equal to 
respectively exposed reserves (ER), i.e. the difference between total SNB reserves and the exemption threshold, the interest rate banks paid 
on demand deposits in December 2014 (DDR) and the interest rate banks paid on sight deposits in December 2014 (SDR). Standard errors are 
clustered by bank. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A
All SNB 
Reserves 
(% of TA)
NIB 
Position 
(% of TA)
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Financial 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Cash 
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
CET1 (% 
of TA)
Demand 
Deposits
Sight 
Deposits
Post*T*DDR -0.19 0.18 -0.14 0.44** 0.10 0.58 0.85*** -0.24*** 0.07 0.08** -0.11***
(0.18) (0.31) (0.23) (0.19) (0.37) (0.49) (0.21) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
Post*T -0.58*** 0.23*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.04 0.18* -0.25*** 0.09*** 0.02 -0.02*** 0.04***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post*DDR 0.58 -1.84 -1.53 0.82 -0.45 -0.51 2.98 -1.11** 0.62 0.22 -0.68*
(1.59) (2.92) (1.21) (1.34) (1.52) (3.18) (2.33) (0.46) (0.85) (0.25) (0.34)
T ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER
Obs. 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 444 1,332 1,332
R2 0.68 0.31 0.39 0.29 0.15 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.18 0.45
Panel B
All SNB 
Reserves 
(% of TA)
NIB 
Position 
(% of TA)
Loan 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Mortgage 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Financial 
Assets (% 
of TA)
Deposit 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
Cash 
Bond 
Funding 
(% of TA)
CET1 (% 
of TA)
Demand 
Deposits
Sight 
Deposits
Post*T*SDR 0.57** -0.47 -0.27* -0.39 -0.03 -0.54 -0.19 -0.15* 0.04 0.03 -0.04
(0.22) (0.31) (0.14) (0.23) (0.16) (0.42) (0.18) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Post*T -0.75*** 0.42*** 0.19*** 0.38*** 0.07 0.45*** -0.04 0.09** 0.02** -0.01 0.02**
(0.03) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post*SDR 1.93 -1.18 -1.54*** 0.24 -0.22 -0.80 1.26* -0.62*** 0.52 0.28 -0.63***
(1.38) (1.18) (0.41) (1.06) (0.47) (1.66) (0.72) (0.21) (0.32) (0.18) (0.15)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 444 1,332 1,332
R2 0.69 0.31 0.41 0.30 0.14 0.27 0.25 0.32 0.15 0.50
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
